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UNITED STATES PROBLEMS IN EASTERN ASIA AND THE ROLE OF THE SEVENTH FLEET

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by

R. J. Harlow

Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS

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AN ABSTRACT

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An Abstract

of

<u>THESIS ADVICE CONCERNING THE REVISED LATEX</u>
<u>AMS-THESIS.STY FOR THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL</u>

by

M. J. Maclaren

Submitted in Fulfillment

Faculty of the School of Undergraduate Service

of The American University

In Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

MASTER OF ARTS

October 1984

The American University
Washington, D. C.

ABSTRACT

The conclusion of World War II brought into clear focus two facts for the United States: warfare had entered a new era with nuclear weapons and the emergence of Communist China brought a direct challenge to United States foreign policy. To meet the Chinese threat the United States has the Seventh Fleet as a military tool to help implement political decision. This thesis examines the relevance of the Seventh Fleet as a military-political tool.

Few direct sources in book form on Seventh Fleet are to be found. Sources of information were: Congressional Record, United States Department of State Bulletins, news media, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, and Chinese periodicals.

The conclusions regarding this Fleet are: it augments SAC as a deterrent force; it is an ideal flexible political-military tool at the brushfire war level; and it is generally impotent to counter the political and psychological guerrilla warfare being conducted in Southeast Asia. The Seventh Fleet is largely circumscribed by the nature of this conflict, but it is still a valid force to the politician within the limits of its mission.

ABSTRACT

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INTRODUCTION

Historically the United States has had important interests and extensive contacts with the Far East. Commodore Perry's visit to Japan, control of the Philippines, involvement in the Boxer Rebellion, oriental immigration problems, military and commercial interests, and deep involvement in World War II all reflect these interests.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, which effected a complete readjustment of the balance of power in the Far East, set the stage for Japanese expansion which culminated in World War II. This alliance essentially established the United States as the primary western power to counter Japanese ambitions. United States diplomacy of the period largely, and logically, stemmed from the weak American military power position in the area. The Root-Takahira Executive Agreement of November 30, 1908, was a product of this weakness. President Theodore Roosevelt was a realist who sought "concessions in exchange for accepting what he did not have the military strength to prevent."[1] Today, the United States diplomacy in the Far East is based on a posture of military strength; however, the grave problems which the

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[1]Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (seventh edition; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), p. 526.

Historically the United States has had important interests and extensive contacts with the Far East. Commodore Perry's visit to Japan, control of the Philippines, intervention in the Boxer Rebellion, extensive military and commercial interests, and deep involvement in World War II all reflect these interests.

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[1]Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (Seventh edition; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), p. 520.

United States is confronted with in the area cannot be solved by military strength alone.

These problems are the result of the collision between western technology, ideas and culture with that of the peoples of Asia. The problems have climaxed in the post-World War II struggle between the interests, goals and objectives of inflamed nationalism (coupled with the "rising expectations" of underdeveloped areas), and the political objectives of the United States to see stability, gradual change and a "status quo" of American power in the area.

With the Chinese Communist Party's success in consolidation of power on the mainland of Asia in October, 1949, and the subsequent Sino-Soviet rift, the primary antagonist for the United States in the Far East is Communist China. The unseen enemy is poverty, illiteracy, nationalism, anti-white colonialism and other real but nebulous forces which create conflict in the area.

Research on the subject has led to the following conclusions:

1. The basic conflict in the Far East is generated by intellectual elites and expanded rapidly to the masses by modern communications. This conflict manifests itself in "rising expectations" for change in social and economic spheres and the demands for change are not being met.

2. Communism, per se, is a "label" which promises

United States is confronted with in the area cannot be solved by military strength alone.

These problems are the result of the collision between modern technology, ideas and cultures with that of the peoples of Asia. The problems have climaxed in the nuclear age. It is simply because the industrial, social and economic objectives of industrialized nationalism (coupled with the "rising expectations" of underdeveloped areas), and the political objectives of the United States to see stability, peaceful change and a "status quo" of Western power in the area.

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2. Communism, for it, is a "label" which promises

dynamic change. The peasant can identify himself with Communism--democracy is alien in nature and scope. Many of the Communist leaders claim to be "purist" in their ideology; however, nationalism generally prevails. The world-wide monolithic Communist movement has been fragmented by the forces of nationalism.[2]

3. Communist China does not factually represent an extension of the "institutionalized" cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States. Due to the divergent national interests of the Soviet Union and Communist China, it would be a fatal error for the United States to assume the cold war objectives of Peking and Moscow were identical. It is reasonable to state that the overall Communist movement objectives in the Far East are threefold and can be summarized as control of:

a. The manpower of China.

b. The industrial capacity of Japan.

c. The resources of Southeast Asia.[3]

---

[2]The historical evolution of the Sino-Soviet schism is a classic example. Each proclaims to be a defender of the true faith. For pertinent comments on "nationalism" vs. "Communism" in Asia see: "America's Primary Interests in Asia," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 31, p. 191. This article is essentially a transcript of the Columbia Broadcasting System television program "Crossroads Asia," August 1, 1954, in which Under Secretary of State Walter B. Smith was interviewed regarding problems in Asia.

[3]"America, Japan and the Future of the Pacific,"

dynamic change. The process can identify climactic con-
ditions--democracy is alive in Nature and people. Many of
the Communist leaders claim to be "purist" in their ideology;
however, nationalism dominates universally. The world-wide
unrealistic Communist movement was born frightened by the
forces of nationalism.[2]

3. Communist China does not realistically represent an
extension of the "Marxist-Leninist" world nor threaten the
Soviet Union and its United States. Due to the divergent
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Asia," Department of State Policy Bulletin, vol. II, p. 171. This
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1, 1954, in which Chou En-lai, Communist China Foreign Minister
and Vice-Premier explicitly invasion in Asia.

[3]"Security Steps and the Problem of the Pacific,"

4. Communist China is the greatest military power of the underdeveloped nations. The United States represents the pinnacle of economic, military and political development which is thwarting the Chinese Communists from attaining their political objectives; therefore, it is the prime target of Red China.

5. To impose political decision in the international arena, military power or threat is still valid; however, the form and nature of military power has been greatly modified due to the advent of nuclear weapons and the mode of conflict selected by revolutionaries in Asia.

6. National interest is the key to political action--ideology the modifier.[4]

7. Because the United States is the world's foremost seapower, one of the primary military weapons used to project its power to influence political events in eastern Asia has been the Seventh Fleet stationed in the Far East. During the post-war period, the role of the Seventh Fleet has not only been military but psychological and, to a lesser degree,

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United States Department of State Press Release 122, March 9, 1954.

[4]Winston Churchill's classic evaluation of the Soviet Union's actions pertain. "I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest." Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 449.

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economic. Among its advantages are mobility, flexibility of weapons, and the fact that it is not dependent upon fixed bases located in foreign countries--all considerations which have political implications.

This paper is concerned with the political struggle of the United States in the Far East since the end of World War II and the use of naval seapower to assist in achieving political decision by military means. Because military policy and war are a continuation of political policy "by other means"[5] the paramount interests are political. It is the objective of this paper to view the Seventh Fleet from the point of view of the United States Department of State and attempt to evaluate this naval unit as a relevant military-political tool. Due to political, economic and military factors, the focal point of conflict in Asia is between the United States and Communist China--and all other issues are peripheral but contributory to the contest.

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[5]Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War, trans. Hans W. Gatzke (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1942), p. 6.

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This paper is concerned with the political strengths of the United States in the Far East since the end of World War II and the use of naval manpower to assist in achieving political objectives by military means. Gunboat military policy for war are a combination of political policy "by other means."[6] The paramount interests are political. It is the objective of this paper to view the Seventh Fleet from the point of view of the United States Department of State and attempt to evaluate this naval unit as a relevant military-political tool. Use to political, economic and military factors) the vital logic of countries in Asia is between the United States and Communist China--and all other issues are peripheral but concurrently to the contest.

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[6] Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War, transl. Hans W. Gatzke (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1942), p. 6.

CHAPTER I

UNITED STATES POST-WORLD WAR II PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST

I. THE OVERALL DILEMMA IN ASIA

Prior to the conclusion of World War II, mainland Asia was largely under the control and occupation of Japan. The Japanese and their "Co-Prosperity Sphere" were, for the most part, hated by the peoples of the occupied countries, but the Japanese had proven the white man was not invincible. This was a lesson that was not soon forgotten.

As the Japanese moved out of their conquered territories, a power vacuum was created. The European colonial powers were unable to return in sufficient strength to reassert their control, thus the forces of revolution and change swept Asia. The overwhelming poverty of the masses, often combined with ineffectual or corrupt indigenous governments, created fertile ground for Communism.[1] Faced with the cold war and its inherent ideological conflict, the

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[1] In the early post-World War II period, Communism in Asia was largely identified with the Soviet Union. For example: the defeat of Japan caused a "power vacuum in eastern Asia which Communism, that imperialistic arm of Soviet Russia, was quick to fill." William J. Sebold, "Japan: Asset of the Free World," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 26, pp. 490-494. From an address made before the Knights of Columbus at Baltimore, Maryland, March 23, 1952.

CHAPTER I

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND THE
PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST

A. THE CHANGING BALANCE IN ASIA

Prior to the conclusion of World War II, mainland Asia was largely under the control and occupation of Japan. The Japanese and their "Co-prosperity Sphere" were, for the most part, hated by the peoples of the occupied countries, but the Japanese had proven the white man was not invincible. This was a lesson that was not soon forgotten.

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United States frequently finds American foreign policy in the unenviable position of supporting ruling regimes simply on the ground that they are anti-communist. At the same time, the bulk of the populace are violently opposed to their government, and the ruling class can remain in power only through "police state" tactics.

The fundamentals of United States foreign policy in the Far East and the problems such policy is designed to cope with have remained relatively stable since 1950. Among the objectives are:[2]

1. Freedom for all peoples.
2. Equal partnership of nations within the principles of the United Nations Charter.
3. Security from aggression, overt or covert.
4. Use of peaceful processes to settle disputes.
5. Material well being for all.
6. Cultural exchange.
7. Good neighbors.

The obstacles to successful American policy include: grinding poverty, lack of capital plant, political inexperience, military weakness, suspicion of each other and the west, lack of technical know-how and a host of similar problems.

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[2]Dean Rusk, "Fundamentals of Far Eastern Policy," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, pp. 465-468. From an address at the National Convention of American Veterans of World War II, at Cleveland, Ohio, September 9, 1950.

United States frequently finds American foreign policy in the unenviable position of supporting ruling regimes simply on the ground that they are anti-communist. At the same time, the bulk of the populace are violently opposed to their government, and the ruling clique can remain in power only through "police state" tactics.

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3. Security from aggression, overt or covert.
4. Use of peaceful processes to settle disputes.
5. Material well being for all.
6. Cultural exchange.
7. Good neighbors.

The obstacles to successful American policy include, prolonged economic, lack of social gains, political ignorance, military weakness, suspicion of each other and the west, lack of technical know-how and a host of similar problems,

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[2]Dean Rusk, "Fundamentals of Far Eastern Policy," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 43, pp. 604-606. From an address at the National Conference of American Veterans of World War II, at Cleveland, Ohio, September 3, 1950.

A close study of United States policy in the Far East will reveal surprising consistency.[3] This is, at times, obscured by political accusations primarily heard during election campaigns or in times of international crisis when it is politically expedient to criticize foreign policy. The popular image of American foreign policy frequently has concepts which are "objectives beyond the traditional scope of foreign policy" and may include the following:[4]

1. Our freedom is not secure unless American ideals are shared.
2. The United States will not impose its ideals or way of life on others.
3. Americans have no territorial ambitions.
4. We support the growth of free political institutions.

These four objectives are sometimes "idealized" by the American press as "democracy" under export label.

However, democracy in the liberal tradition requires certain "pre-conditions" to survive. A few of these are:

---

[3]Among the best sources for authoritative background on American foreign policy are the studies prepared for the United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. For example: "United States Foreign Policy--Asia," Study No. 5, 1 November 1959, by Conlon Associates Limited; "United States Foreign Policy, Basic Aims of United States Policy, Study No. 7," by Council of Foreign Relations, November 25, 1959. Both publications are printed by the United States Government Printing Office.

[4]August Heckscher, "United States Policy Objectives," Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. 39, No. 6 (December 1, 1959), p. 43.

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[4]Amos Hendrickson, "United States Policy Objectives," Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. 23, No. 2 (November 1, 1920), p. 13.

considerable experience in self-government, majority rule concept, a high rate of literacy, tolerance on the part of the parties in power to give up power on a free election basis, a well-informed public opinion, a relatively decent standard of living, an able and experienced bureaucracy, a homogeneous and integrated society, the maintenance of peace for a substantial period, and a strong and able middle class. In some areas where we "wishfully" want democracy in the Far East, not one single element of those required is present. Security in the form of major military, economic and social control or aid is necessary in direct proportion to the lack of the required elements listed above in a given situational base.

Basic to the American program is foreign aid in one form or another. Possible gains have been, and are, frequently offset by corrupt administration of aid, population increases nullifying any positive increases in standards of living, propaganda that aid is a form of neo-colonialism, etc. Aid frequently is used to promote industry; however, the goals of the industry may not meet the true needs of the people.

> There are two particular risks in the attempted imitation of a Western industrialized economy by an underdeveloped one. First, in an age of virulent nationalism every government wants to be armed like a great power . . . . Secondly, the west --especially the United States--presents a far too modern model for Asia's needs, one in which the

emphasis is no longer on production but on consumption. The American model discourages savings.[5]

In spite of prodigious efforts and great aspirations on the part of the backward nations, most appear to be surely failing in their attempts to meet the challenge of "rising expectations." In 1956, the industrialized free societies enjoyed a gross national product ten times as great as the less-industrialized free societies, and by 1976 (a 20-year period) it was likely to become fifteen times as great.[6] This should not be unexpected, for it is estimated that for a given economy to "take off" and be self-sustaining, a surplus of 12 per cent to 15 per cent of the gross national product is necessary. Put in a different perspective, Adlai Stevenson, in the 7 February 1959 issue of The Saturday Review, wrote that the Atlantic Community, with 16 per cent of the world's population, enjoyed 70 per cent of the world's wealth! One key facet of the problem, of course, is the population explosion which is wiping out many gains made by the underdeveloped nations.

A further general comment about the population explosion is necessary as it provides one of the greatest barriers

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[5]Raymond Aron, "Asia: Between Malthus and Marx," Encounter (August, 1954), p. 56.

[6]Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Foreign Economic Policy for the Twentieth Century (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1958), p. 74.

[illegible] Raymond Aron, "Arabs: Between Nations and Faith," [illegible] Commentary (April, 1961), pp. 345.

[illegible] Mediterranean Breakwater Plan," Foreign Economic Policy for the Developing Countries (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. [illegible].

to effective United States policy in Asia. The population explosion may deny backward nations the opportunity to improve their lot, regardless of what help the industrialized nations give. In Asia, the Malthusian theory works almost perfectly. The British experience in India and the present Communist Chinese problem are examples. In the latter case, the gross national product is barely keeping ahead of the net increase in population. The result is: running as fast as they can--in place. Dr. John Rock states that we have reached our "most critical point in history." He says:

> The U.S.: This country can handle twice its population without undue trouble, but we can't handle the political impact of other lands doubling their population. More than half the world goes to bed hungry every night now. More and more people are beginning to realize that this implicit threat isn't anything to play with. We may have reached the most critical point in [mankind's] history. The growth rate is as urgent a problem as nuclear energy.[7]

Each day that passes finds a greater awareness and understanding of the critical problems posed by the so-called "population explosion."[8]

Another problem area is communication. Not in the mechanical or technical sense of communication, but in the sense of the exchange of ideas with each side completely

---

[7]Dr. John Rock in an article on birth control. Life Magazine (May 10, 1963), p. 40B.

[8]One of the more comprehensive studies of the population problem is: Richard M. Fagley, The Population Explosion and Christian Responsibility (New York: Colliers, 1962).

to effective United States policy in Asia. The population explosion may deny deserved nations the opportunity to improve their lot, regardless of what full use Industrialized nations give. In Asia, the Malthusian theory works almost perfectly. The British experience in India and the Western Communist Chinese problem are examples. In the latter case, the gross national product is nearly keeping ahead of the net increase in population. The result is: running as fast as they can--in place. Dr. John Cobb states that we have reached the "most critical point in history." He says:

> The U.S.: This country can decide [illegible] the population explosion problem, but in one's hands the political legacy of other lands depending their population. Soon than half the world goes to bed hungry every night now. More and more people are beginning to realize that this implicit threat isn't anything to play with. We may have reached the most critical point in [mankind's] history. The growth crisis is an urgent problem as nuclear energy.[8]

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[8]Dr. John Cobb in an article in World Outlook. Life Magazine (May 10, 1963), p. 69A.

[9]One of the most recent discussions [illegible] of the population explosion is: Richard M. Ingley, The Population Explosion and Christian Responsibility (New York: Corinth, 1963).

understanding and responding with feeling. The latter emotion is generally lacking. Understanding plus feeling or complete identification with the problem equals reinforced education. This is one of the key areas in which the United States Peace Corps can make a significant contribution.

Due to lack of communication with understanding and feeling, the United States has frequently failed to communicate in underdeveloped areas and Communism has succeeded. Communism generally talks the "same language" of the peasant[9] but democracy, as we advertise it, is completely alien in scope and content to the "mass man" of the world. It is too "Utopian"; he wants food and action--not the right to vote. The average citizens of the industrialized world, and particularly Americans, have no concept of the pressures for survival that are institutionalized throughout the countries described as "the backward nations." We frequently cannot communicate.

For United States foreign policy to solve the dilemma it is faced with in the Far East, major reforms must be initiated by the peoples of Asia themselves. They must control population, institute land reform, break down social barriers of caste and class, revise taxation, wisely use the

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[9]Michael Edwardes, Asia in the Balance (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 94.

[illegible] Bloomfield, 1962), p. [illegible]

aid given, refrain from anti-white propagandizing, create security for their peoples and attract foreign capital investments by pledging protection for such investment--and the list goes on indefinitely.

In conclusion, the United States is faced with grave and enduring problems which combat effective political action on our part. At the same time, American foreign policy is unequivocally committed to resolution of the Asian political problem for the foreseeable future.

Communist China and Formosa

The political problems posed by Communist China are central to the issues which must be resolved by the United States in the Far East. As the Chinese Communist Party gained in strength to the point where Soviet ideological leadership could be challenged and overt military action against India became feasible, its national objectives became more clearly discernible. Its major goals include:

1. Security, internal and external.
2. Adequate food supplies.
3. Establishment of a modern industrial base independent of foreign aid.
4. Absorption of Formosa.
5. Leadership of the Communist world.
6. Setting the ideological pattern for the Communist movement in underdeveloped countries.
7. Extension of Chinese borders to those of traditional China.[10]

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[10]Helmut G. Callis, "The Chinese-United States Stalemate," Current History, December 1959, p. 340.

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Communist China and Taiwan

The political problems posed by Communist China are
confined to the issues which may be resolved by the United
States in the Far East. In the Chinese Communist Party
united in attempts to the points where Soviet ideological
leadership could be challenged and overt military action
against India become feasible, the national objectives be-
came more clearly discernible. The major goals included:

1. Security, internal and external.
2. Adequate food supplies.
3. Establishment of a modern industrial base inde-
pendent of foreign aid.
4. Absorption of Formosa.
5. Leadership of the Communist world.
6. Uniting the ideological factors for the Communist
movement in underdeveloped countries.
7. Retention of Chinese borders by threat of treach-
erous China.[10]

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[10]Wolfram S. Cultis, "The Chinese-United States Crisis," Current History, December 1958, p. 340.

8. Recognition in the United Nations as the "de jure" government of China.
9. Expansion of foreign trade.
10. Domination of Asia.
11. To see the West suffer retribution for the humiliation of China during the imperialistic era.
12. World-wide Communist revolution.[11]

The immediate conflict with American objectives can be readily ascertained in the social, economic and political areas. The strategic goals of the United States primarily found in the military spheres of responsibility can be stated as follows:

> America's broad interests in the Far Pacific and Eastern Asia might be summed up under three headings. One is to insure its own continental security by command of the Pacific Ocean, which is best conserved by a defense line on the island chain along the East Asian shore. Another is to prevent the expansion of Communist power to either mainland or island areas now in the Free World. A third is to maintain the ready capability of striking powerful strategic blows at possible enemies in the Far East, in reprisal for surprise attack on the United States or one of its allies.[12]

The areas of direct conflict are apparent within the military sphere and are greatly intensified in the economic and ideological fields. Thus, we find the military, economic

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[11]A limited statement of Chinese Communist objectives can be found in J. Graham Parson's (Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs) testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 8, 1960. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 1084, pp. 532-537. For an expanded discussion see: R. G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 85-90.

[12]William H. Hessler, "Blue Water Around Red China," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings (February, 1953), p. 31.

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Jaw" government of China.
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[11] A limited statement of Chinese Communist objective can be found in J. Gaston Sigur's (Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs) testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 8, 1950, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXII, pp. 378-387. For an expanded discussion see R. L. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 85-90.

[12] William R. Kintner, "How Metaphysical Can China," F. E. Trend Institute Discussions (February, 1951), p. 31.

and psychological festers "jelling" into concrete political problems which are compounded by the "hard line" attitudes manifested by both the United States and "Stalinist" China vis-à-vis each other.

Further complicating the question of China is the Formosan issue. Public opinion is largely divided as how best to resolve this dilemma; however, United States policy has been explicit on the subject since June 27, 1950, when by Presidential mandate the neutralization of Formosa became effective through the policing action of the Seventh Fleet.[13] The President's use of land and naval forces for protection purposes has many precedents. From 1812 to 1932, there were no less than eighty-five recorded incidents.[14]

The reaction of Communist China to this move by the United States was violent. The Seventh Fleet patrol in the Taiwan Straits appeared to contradict President Truman's statement of five months earlier. "The United States government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement

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[13]President of the United States Harry S. Truman's statement placing American military forces in action in Korea and the Seventh Fleet's policing mission in the Taiwan Straits was released to the press June 27, 1950. The full statement may be found in the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, p. 5.

[14]United States Congress, House, Report 2495, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, Congressional Record, p. 67; or Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, pp. 177-178.

and psychological obstacle "history" [and] economic problems which are compounded by the "hard line" attitudes manifested by both the United States and "Realistic" China vis-à-vis each other.

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[13]Statement of the United States Navy S. Truman's statement placing American military forces in action in Korea and the Security Council's [illegible] decision in the Taiwan matter was released to the press June 27, 1950. The full statement may be found in the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, p. 1.

[14]United States Congress, House, Report 2635, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, Committee[illegible] Report, p. 371 or Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, pp. 171-176.

in the civil conflict in China."[15] The impact on the Chinese Communist Party can be clearly seen by the following news coverage:

> New China News Agency. Peking, November 4, 1950. There is no limit on United States aggressive ambitions . . . . [The U. S. desires] to annex Korea . . . invade China, rule Asia and conquer the world. United States President Truman ordered . . . the Seventh Fleet to invade Chinese Sea and carry out armed intervention to prevent the liberation of Taiwan.[16]

By 1957, the Peking version became "June 27, 1950. U. S. President Truman announces armed intervention in Korea and the military occupation of the island of Taiwan."[17]

The Formosan question is more thoroughly covered in Chapter II of this paper; however, its strategic military significance might be further considered in light of General Douglas MacArthur's comments:

> The entire Pacific Ocean has become a vast moat to protect us as long as we hold it . . . . The holding of . . . the western Pacific is entirely dependent upon holding all the segments thereof . . . . For that reason . . . under no circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control.[18]

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[15] Statement by President Harry S. Truman released to the press January 5, 1950. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 22, p. 79.

[16] Survey of the Mainland China Press, trans. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, No. 4, November 5-6, 1950.

[17] Handbook on People's China (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1957), p. 195. [In English.]

[18] General Douglas MacArthur in an address to the Congress of the United States, April 19, 1951, Congressional Record, Vol. 97, part 3, p. 4123.

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> New China News Agency, Peking, November 4, 1950.
> There is no limit to United States aggressive militarism . . . Little by little depleted in Korea . . . invade China, Asia and conquer the world. United States fraudulent Truman declared . . . the Taiwan Flaws to invade China for the purpose of armed intervention to prevent the liberation of Taiwan.[17]

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> The eastern Pacific ocean has become a vast moat to protect us as long as we held it . . . The holding of . . . the western frontier is relatively defenseless upon holding all the approaches . . . The east Pacific . . . means an effectiveness much greater than under Communist control.[18]

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[16] Statement by Premier Harry S. Truman released to the press January 5, 1950. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXI, p. 79.

[17] Report of the United China Press, Peking, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Nov. 4, November 5-6, 1950.

[17] Pamphlet on Foreign China Trading: Foreign Languages Press, 1951, p. 135. Its Capital.

[18] General Douglas MacArthur in an address by the Congress of the United States, April 19, 1951, Congressional Record, Vol. 97, part 1, p. 4123.

In summation, Communist China represents the full range of dynamic political problems: it maintains an aggressive military stance; it exploits psychological fanaticism; it exists in an economic quagmire which breeds venom and unrest towards the industrialized west; and it has an avowed aim of destruction of the western democratic political-economic system epitomized by the United States. The only points of comfort in the situation are: (1) Peking does not possess nuclear weapons; (2) Red China is extremely weak in seapower and air strength; (3) the growing Sino-Soviet conflict which has already produced major schisms in the Communist world; and (4) Communist China suffered a major economic retreat with the failure of the "great leap forward" movement. In contrast to Communist China, Formosa represents much less of a political problem. Tied to the United States by treaty and dependent upon American political, military and economic support, most problems with Formosa are minor. Those problems which do arise are generally resolved to the mutual satisfaction of both parties and no major conflict-of-interests are foreseen for the immediate future.

Japan

During World War II, the western democracies envisioned Nationalist China as the powerful and friendly anchor in the Far East. At the conclusion of the war, in a

In summation, Communist China represents the full range of dynamic political problems. It maintains an aggressive military stance; it exploits psychological warfare; it mobilizes its economic resources; it makes it an economic weapon which breeds unrest and undermines the industrialized world and it has an avowed aim of destruction of the western democratic political-economic system epitomized by the United States. The only points of conflict in the situation are: (1) Taking down and pressure another notch; (2) Red China is extremely weak in manpower and air strength; (3) the growing Sino-Soviet rift which has already produced major schisms in the Communist world; and (4) Communist China suffered a major economic reverse with the failure of the "great leap forward" movement. In contrast to Communist China, Formosa represents much less of a political problem. Tied to the United States by treaty and dependent upon American political, military and economic support, most problems with Formosa are economic. These problems might be solved generally resolved to the mutual satisfaction of both parties and no major conflict-ridden risks are foreseen for the immediate future.

Japan

During World War II, the western democracies envisioned militarized Japan as the powerful and dynamic enemy in the Far East. As the reduction of the army in a

swift chain of events, the cold war started, Communism swept China, and the United States, in particular, urgently required support on its Pacific flank. The most practical and obvious solution was to re-create a strong, sympathetic Japan to assume the role that was to have been Nationalist China's. Following the Korean War, the Japanese economic recovery was successful and complete. The Japanese have proven again that they are an intelligent and energetic people. Their post-war recovery can be compared favorably with that of West Germany's. "Japan's annual growth rate in gross national product, which is one of the highest in the world today, reached 15% in 1961."[19] Not only is the new industry of Japan efficient, but the product is of high quality which can compete on almost any market.

Yet, Japan's economic position today is similar to its situation just prior to World War II--a demand for expanding markets. Thus, Japan is sorely tempted to flirt with Communist Chinese trade which has grave implications for the United States Far Eastern policy. Today (1964), there are some eighty Japanese firms doing business with Communist China. Among the reasons for this trade are: first, there is a belief that someday China will be a major market.

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[19]Chitoshi Yanaga, "Japan's Role in the Free World," U. S. Naval War College Review, Vol. 16, No. 6, February 1964, p. 4.

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[18] Editorial [illegible], "[illegible] Rule in Ohio Five Months," [illegible] [illegible], [illegible].

Second is the fear that western European nations will move into China and squeeze out Japan. Third is the willingness to sustain losses with the future prospects of large orders.[20]

As Japan looked about for new markets, it was only natural that China would be considered as soon as Japan had freedom of choice after the 1951 treaty with the United States. In June 1952, the first trade agreement between private Japanese businessmen and Red China took place. This is logical since Japan certainly can identify China as a former market--before World War II, 17.3 per cent of Japan's total export trade was with China.[21] Within eight months, however, the Red Chinese stated their bargaining position for continued Japanese trade. The following political ends are still the desired goals of Red China vis-à-vis Japan and trade is definitely used as a "lever": Japan is to sever ties with the United States, break relations with Nationalist China, establish full diplomatic relations with Peking, and trade on a government-to-government basis. Japan, to date, has successfully resisted Communist Chinese pressures in the

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[20] Ibid., p. 14.

[21] Warren Unna, Washington Post, October 10, 1962, p. 12.

[illegible] Japanese [illegible] with [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

economic sphere primarily through United States understanding and support.[22]

As Japan's capacity and production has increased, some of the markets "hardened" against Japanese goods. Her Asiatic neighbors (excluding Red China) could not forget the Japanese role in World War II and were reluctant to trade. In the United States, particularly in the South, there was marked resistance to Japanese products which took the form of discriminatory legislation.[23] Japan officially protested the legislation and delivered a note to the United States Government which reflected the probable reaction of the Japanese people and its effect on foreign policy. One specific result anticipated was inciting "neutralist" and "left wing" elements in Japan to step up attacks on the United States.

With the rise of the Common Market and increased competition throughout the "free world," it does not seem reasonable that American domestic politics will welcome

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[22]Early post-Korean War attitudes towards Japanese trade can be found in U. S. Department of State Press Release 281 of May 23, 1955, entitled, "Some Aspects of Our Far East Policy"; and "Japan's Progress and Prospects," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 30, pp. 513-517. This article is essentially the address given by Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy to the Japan Society in New York, New York, on March 18, 1955.

[23]Eli Abel, "Boycott of Japan Upsets Officials," The New York Times, April 12, 1956, p. 5.

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As Japan's capacity and production has increased, some of the markets "reopened" against Japanese goods. The Asiatic neighbors (excluding Red China) could not forget the Japanese role in World War II and were reluctant to trade. In the United States, particularly in the South, there was marked resistance to Japanese imports which took the form of discriminatory legislation.[23] Japan officially protested the legislation and delivered a note to the United States Government which reflected the probable reaction of the Japanese people and the effect on foreign policy. The specific result anticipated was inciting "neutralist" and "left wing" elements in Japan to step up attacks on the United States.

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[23] Bill Abel, "Protest of Japan Rejects Criticism," The New York Times, April 12, 1959, p. 2.

Japanese manufacturers in spite of an awareness on the part of the American people of Japan's need. We must "not weigh Japan's need of us against our need of Japan. We need each other."[24]

It, therefore, appears inevitable that there will be an increase in Sino-Japanese trade, which, in turn, will reflect a more conciliatory attitude by Japan towards Red China.

Before leaving the critical Japanese economic picture, there has been a significant advance made by Japan in its major problem regarding overpopulation.

> Japan's birth rate is practically nothing today . . . [reasons are that] it enjoys one of the highest literacy rates in the world (98%) and there is no religious inhibition to birth control or abortion.[25]

This breakthrough assures Japan a favorable position for economic competition in the Far East for the foreseeable future.

To more clearly assess the United States position in the Far East, the goals of Japan, our one bastion of economic strength and the only model of modern industry and democracy

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[24]Harold S. Quigley, "Japan, Ally for Peace," Current History, July 1956, p. 19.

[25]Rock, loc. cit.

in Asia, must be considered. While the goals of Communist China (supra, pp. 13-14) clearly represent those of an aggressive revisionist state, the below-listed Japanese short and long-term goals reflect for the most part a "status quo" nation attitude which can be attributed to the favorable economic atmosphere Japan enjoys and the vivid impact on the Japanese psyche due to the destruction and disastrous defeat suffered by Japan in World War II. The goals include: security by alliance or through the United Nations but, in any event, not by large Japanese armed forces, avoidance of war, continued economic prosperity, expansion of foreign markets, unrestricted sources of raw materials and foodstuffs, some form of democracy, internal stability, banning of atomic weapons[26] and return of the Ryukyu Islands to Japanese jurisdiction.[27]

In view of Japanese national goals, it is clearly to their advantage to maintain the present close ties with the United States. The political problems faced by the U. S. Department of State in Washington with regards to Japan have largely generated from our own indoctrination in the

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[26] Yanaga, op. cit., p. 11.

[27] John M. Allison, Ambassador to Japan, stated on June 27, 1956, the United States had "no intention of permanent possession of the islands." U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 35.1, p. 60.

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[36] Ramsey, op. cit., p. 18.

[37] See H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, chapter on "Germany, Japan [37], Europe, and United States and the Integration of Germany into Post-War Europe," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXIII, p. 30.

immediate post-war period. We imposed a Constitution on Japan wherein, by Article IX, the Japanese renounced the use of force as a means of settling international disputes; and it states that land, sea, air forces as well as other war potential will never be maintained.[28] The fact that Japan was disarmed has been publicly lamented on several occasions. For example, in November 1953, Secretary of State Dulles agreed with a speech made by the Vice President of the United States, Richard Nixon, who openly stated the United States had made an error regarding Japanese disarmament.[29] The American view that Japan should be militarily strong and rearm has been a recurrent theme with the increasing threat of Communist China.[30]

Today, the United States desires Japan to rearm for its self-defense to reduce the American military burden in the Far East. The Japanese Government cannot greatly increase the size of the "self defense" force due to strong public opinion which is voiced in a democratic atmosphere. This, in turn, is largely a legacy from American indoctrination during the post-war occupation. The present Japanese

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[28]John M. Maki, Government and Politics in Japan (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 247.

[29]John Foster Dulles, "Disarmament of Japan," Department of State Bulletin, November 24, 1953, Vol. 29, p. 788.

[30]Walter S. Robertson, "U. S. Policy Towards Japan," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 30, February 1954, pp. 229-233.

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military posture can be stated as:

> Slowly, however, Japan has been building up her defense forces until today her ground, air and maritime self-defense forces total a quarter of a million, comprising 13 ground divisions, 800 American-designed jet fighters, and a navy of two dozen destroyers and six submarines, and plans for helicopter carriers. She possesses no nuclear arms, which she prefers not to own, nor does she permit the United States to bring nuclear warheads into Japan. At the present time, she is capable of a holding action for 30 days against a conventional invasion force. For her security, she depends on the military might of the United States through the United States-Japan Security Treaty which was signed in January 1960, and she prefers to keep it this way for some time. Nevertheless, Japan remains the Far Eastern bastion against communism, and as such she contributes toward the security plans of the United States.[31]

The last major political crisis with Japan took place in May 1960, when the Kishi government renewed the American-Japanese "mutual cooperation and security" treaty.[32] The objectionable feature of this treaty to the average Japanese citizen was that the United States would still retain the right to use bases in Japan. The treaty was ratified; however, the Kishi government fell, riots and violence ensued

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[31]Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

[32]The evolution of post-World War II Japanese-American security treaties can be found as follows: United States-Japanese Security Treaty of September 8, 1951, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 25, pp. 464-465; Text of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between the United States and Japan, March 8, 1954, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 30, pp. 520-525; and Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, January 19, 1960, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 42.1, pp. 184-198.

military posture can be stated as:

> Already, however, Japan has been expanding up her defense forces until today her ground, air and maritime self-defense forces equal a quarter of a million, consisting of 13 ground divisions, 900 American-designed jet fighters, and a navy of two hundred destroyers and all submarines, and plans for helicopter carriers. The prospects of nuclear arms, which the products are of use, was done for perhaps the United States by having nuclear weapons than Japan. At the present time, she is capable of a holding action for 30 days against a conventional invasion force. For her security, she depends on the military might of the United States through the United States-Japan Security Treaty which was signed in January 1960, and she prefers to keep it this way for the time being. Henceforth, Japan remains the Far Eastern bastion against communism, and is both and significantly toward the security plans of the United States.[31]

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[31] Tanaka, op. cit., pp. 8-12.

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and the proposed visit of President Eisenhower the following month was cancelled.[33]

However, of all the arguments for continued cooperation with the United States, the greatest is security. The Japanese suffer no illusions about the balance of power in the Far East nor do the Red Chinese and Soviet denials of imperialistic intentions dupe the Japanese. Since Japan represents the greatest concentration of industrial power in all Asia coupled with vast technical knowledge, it is apparent that Japan is a prime Communist target.

In summation, the key to the Japanese problem lies in the field of economics, and since 1958 the Japanese government's attitude has not changed to any marked degree in regard to Red China. It consistently "leans" towards the American view; but the need and desire for trade with Red China remains. And this need is growing daily as her expanding production requires markets. The remarks of John Foster Dulles in 1954 are still valid today.

> Japan must trade to live, and if the free nations fail to make it possible for Japan to earn its way, then inevitably, though reluctantly, her people would turn elsewhere. This would be stupid from an economic standpoint . . . from a political standpoint it requires little imagination to visualize what would happen if Russia, China and Japan became a united hostile group in the Pacific.

It was difficult enough for the U. S. to defeat

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[33] Maki, op. cit., pp. 189-195.

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> Japan when Japan fought alone in the Pacific with China its enemy and Russia neutral. The free world must shun economic policies which would press Japan into becoming the ally or the tool of Communist China and Soviet Russia.[34]

A commonly accepted proposition in international relations is that two of the primary goals of any nation are: (1) survival, and (2) growth. Keeping this in mind, note how pertinent these remarks are:

> But diplomacy must plan for possible contingencies. Peiping has promised massive trade if the country (Japan) denounces its security treaty with us. China pledges aid in restoring sovereignty over American-occupied Okinawa. This impresses Japan's opposition Socialists. Right now they are weak and their prospects are poor. But any economic crisis might easily catapult them into office. . . . as long as we can keep (Japan's) trade balances relatively healthy, it is almost certain a strongly pro-American administration will remain in office.
>
> However, diplomacy cannot control the economics of democracy. Any recession in the U. S. will be mirrored in Japanese ballot boxes . . . . In Washington, the Pentagon has a large say in relationships with Japan . . . . [In Japan] the big voice is business; business is survival.[35]

Japan's problem is readily discernible. The solutions to it are difficult to find and, unfortunately for Japan and the West, tend toward greater activity with the Communist world. It might be noted that, while discussing the aspect

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[34] "Security in the Pacific," speech by John Foster Dulles, June 11, 1954, United States Department of State Bulletin, 30:921-923, June 28, 1954.

[35] C. L. Sulzberger, "Can Asian Flu Come From America?," New York Times, October 14, 1957, p. 26.

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of trade with Red China with a member of the Japanese Embassy staff in Washington, D. C., the staff member repeated that one obstacle to greater trade is that Red China requires long-term credit to pay for most purchases. This is generally unacceptable to the Japanese.

The Chinese are using trade, or the promise of trade, as the "carrot" on the end of a stick in the attempt to gain their political, legal, diplomatic, as well as economic goals from Japan.

Japan represents a critical makeweight in the balance of power struggle between the United States and Red China in the Far East. Japan's contribution to the democracies falls into three categories: military (Japanese potential and strategic bases), economic and ideological. The latter is by far the most significant.

> Japan's experience and achievements in industrial modernization are an eloquent testimony to the fact that economic progress can be achieved successfully without the help of communist ideology or techniques and they give the lie to communism's assertion that the communist way is the best, if not the only, way to rapidly develop Asian nations.[36]

The political problem facing the United States vis-à-vis Japan is to support Japan in maintaining its healthy economy and insuring that strategic military bases continue to be available to American forces in the event the Japanese

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[36]Yanaga, op. cit., p. 8.

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Self Defense Force remains so limited in size and scope as to be relatively ineffective for the total defense of Japan.

Korea

At the conclusion of World War II, Korea was divided into two zones at the 38th parallel to facilitate the surrender of the Japanese. Russians accepted the surrender to the north and Americans in the south. This effectively set the stage for the Korean War as two hostile camps developed and the cold war became more intense. Compounding the Korean problem is the fact that industry and mining are in the northern area while the southern area is basically oriented towards agricultural pursuits--thus the areas are complementary in nature.

On June 25, 1950, North Korean armies staged a surprise attack, and on June 27, 1950, American ground forces were ordered to Korea. By October 1950, the tide of battle had reversed, and United Nations forces, primarily Americans, approached the Yalu River. At this point, Chinese Communist forces entered the fighting to bolster the sagging North Koreans. The condensed version of the Korean War from Communist China's point of view is:

> 25 June 1950. The Syngman Rhee government of South Korea, directed by the U. S. aggressors, launches an all-out attack on the Korean Democratic Republic.[37]

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[37] Handbook on Peoples China, op. cit., p. 194.

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> 2 October 1950. U. S. aggressive armies cross 38th parallel and drive toward China's frontier. 25 October 1950. Chinese People's Volunteers join with Korean Peoples Army to launch counter offensive against U. S. invading forces.[38]

From October 1950, until today, in spite of the armistice signed on 27 July 1953, Korea represents a confrontation of American and Communist Chinese power.

The current American political problem in Korea largely evolves around (1) economic aid, (2) military support, and (3) the question of which one of the political factions to back in an unstable political atmosphere. Of the three basic facets of the Korean problem, (3) frequently causes the government of the United States the most embarrassment.

In conclusion, contemporary Korea represents a stalemate; but the potential for a "brush fire" conflict is ever present for the United States due to the American commitment to provide military support to the Republic of Korea.

Southeast Asia

In many respects, Southeast Asia today represents the classical patterns of political problems found in Asia as a whole: social ferment, society in transition, virulent nationalism, a denial of "rising expectations," as well as

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[38] Ibid., p. 196.

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[16] Ibid., p. 194.

problems created by overpopulation and Communism. There are notable differences, however, which must be recognized as these differences demand unique solutions to the problems they create. American diplomacy recognizes these differences fortunately and modifies its actions accordingly.[39]

Among the differences to take into account are: (1) Except for Thailand, the entire area was under European control prior to World War II. Therefore, anti-white colonialism is especially volatile. (2) Large segments of the population consist of the so-called "Overseas Chinese" whose loyalties have usually been to China; (3) Surplus food-producing regions make the area particularly attractive to Communist China; and (4) terrain and climate are ideally suited to infiltration and guerrilla warfare.

Because of the vital importance of the Overseas Chinese to the overall Southeast Asia political picture, further explanation is required of their position. Due to the "two China" situation (Nationalist:Communist), the Overseas Chinese picture is somewhat confused. However, Communist China goes to great lengths propagandizing that their loyalty

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[39]Kenneth T. Young, "The United States and Southeast Asia," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 33, pp. 843-845. K. T. Young was Director of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, U. S. Department of State, at the time of this address made before the American Council of Commerce and Industry at New York on October 20, 1955.

is and should be to Peking as the true representative of China.[40] To counter Peking in this sphere, Chiang Kai-shek makes the same plea. For example, in October, 1963, he "calls on sixteen million Overseas Chinese to prepare for national recovery"[41] with the direct implication the Overseas Chinese will play a major role against Peking in any movement back to the mainland. In any event, the specific responsibilities of the Overseas Chinese have been clearly outlined.

> Communist plans for the Overseas Chinese were announced in 1950 by Ho Hsiang-ning, chief Commissioner of Overseas Chinese Affairs. He said their duty was, (1) to form a united front with local leftists; (2) to resist U. S. and Allied influence; (3) to act as the "outer circle" of the vanguard of Communism.[42]

In summation, Southeast Asia, as well as Communist China, Formosa, Korea, and Japan, present the United States with complex political, economic and military problems. With Chapter I of this paper as background for the perplexing questions facing the U. S. Department of State vis-à-vis the Far East, Chapter II deals with specific major historical events in which the Seventh Fleet made a significant military contribution to the solution of those questions.

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[40] A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Harper Bros., 1960), pp. 172-210.

[41] Chinese News Service [English], Vol. NN-LXIII-43, p. 3, New York, New York.

[42] Anthony Harrigan, "Sea Power: Bulwark Against Chinese Communist Imperialism," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings (June 1960), p. 72.

is now bound to be felt by the rich industrialists of China,[44] to counter rioting in this sphere, Chiang Kai-shek makes his move. Thus emerging, in October, 1927, as "Guilin of eighteen million Chinese to perform for national recovery,"[45] with the direct implication the Chinese will play a major role against Beijing in any movement bound to his maintain. In any event, the possible responsibilities of the Overseas Chinese have been clearly defined.

Communist plans for the overseas Chinese were announced in 1930 by Mo Chiang-ming, their Commissioner of Overseas Chinese Affairs. He said that they would: (1) be formed a united front with local leaders (2) be united U. S. and United Nations; (3) be put at the "sole right" of the Vanguard of Communism.[46]

In summation, doctrinaire Marx, as well as Communist China, Formosa, Korea, and Japan, presents the United with complex political, economic and military problems. With Chapter I of this paper as background for the geopolitical questions facing the U. S. in Southeast of Asia vis-à-vis the Far East, Chapter II deals with specific major historical events in which the Overseas Chinese played a significant military role in the defense of these countries.

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[44] A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 174-175.

[45] Lyman Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 3, Hsu Yung, Hsu Hsu.

[46] Anthony Kuo-Ching Yen, Overseas Chinese Against Chinese Communist Imperialism," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings (June 1960), p. 72.

CHAPTER II

HISTORIC ROLE OF THE SEVENTH FLEET

I. THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

Japan ended World War II in total defeat, primarily as the result of United States military action. Thus, at the conclusion of hostilities, Japan could and did expect the worse from the occupation forces. Yet, the preconceived ideas of the Japanese regarding Americans just never materialized.

> Of even greater importance were the more constructive aspects of the occupation, which contributed to its success. The first was a psychological factor of high value; the favorable reaction to the good conduct of the occupation troops . . . . Japanese official propaganda during most of the war had assiduously developed the "Americans are beasts" theme. By the time hostilities ended, the Japanese population was apparently convinced that American Armed Forces were made up almost exclusively of brutes, sadists, rapists . . . . However, it soon became apparent that the vast majority of the American troops were quite the reverse. For the most part--exceptions were certainly not lacking--they turned out to be almost ridiculously non-military in bearing, kind, generous, helpful, understanding, and eager to learn about Japan and its people.[1]

The United States encouraged Japan to rebuild its industry and gave large amounts of aid to this end. The Japanese recovery has been phenomenal, and the United States

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[1] John M. Maki, Government and Politics in Japan (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 57.

CHAPTER II

DIPLOMATIC ROLE OF THE ADVANCE PARTY

I. THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

Japan ended World War II in total defeat, primarily as the result of United States military action. Thus, at the conclusion of hostilities, Japan could and did expect the worse from the occupation forces. Yet, the preconceived ideas of the Japanese regarding Americans just never materialized.

Of even greater importance were the more constructive aspects of the occupation, which contributed to its success. The first was a psychological factor of high value; the favorable reaction to the good conduct of the occupation troops . . . Japanese difficulty people made during most of the way had meticulously developed the "American Ace Heuristic Theme." By the time hostilities ended, the Japanese population was appreciably convinced that American Armed Forces were made up almost exclusively of heroes, zealots, reformers . . . However, it soon became apparent that the vast majority of the American troops were quite the reverse. For the most part--exceptions were certainly not lacking--they turned out to be almost ridiculously non-military in bearing, kind, generous, helpful, open-minded, and eager to learn about Japan and its people.[1]

The United States encouraged Japan to rebuild its industry and gave large amounts of aid to this end. Thus Japanese recovery has been phenomenal, and the United States

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[1] John M. Kautz, Government and Politics in Japan (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954), p. 213.

played the major role in supporting the recovery by not only aid but in providing a major market for the finished products. Thus, the post-war period with the great common interests and close relationship with America has had a tremendous social and cultural impact on Japan. The occupation may be considered as one of the world's greatest and successful social engineering projects ever attempted. All strata of society have been affected; and, albeit, Japanese culture remains Asian, it has a strong western modification.

Among the "positive" results of the occupation was the introduction of democracy to Japan. The Japanese have responded quickly to democracy. Though there are many aspects of Japanese political life which are not in tune with our ideas of democracy, they have assimilated the basic concepts and are definitely pro-western in the ideological sense.

While the occupation of Japan was primarily an Army role, the United States Navy made major contributions in the logistic support areas and the Seventh Fleet, in particular, made its impressions at those ports and naval bases set aside for exclusive U. S. Naval use. The synthesis of Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps forces was so complete in the occupation, one cannot isolate a given branch of the service to evaluate its specific value to the success of the occupation. It is fair to say that the bulk of the occupation of Japan in military, economic and, to a large degree,

psychological areas were a direct result of U. S. Army action and conduct; however, the U. S. Air Force and U. S. Navy made significant contributions in critical areas.

II. KOREAN WAR

From the military point of view, the Korean War may have started because of the Soviet Union's miscalculation of American reaction to the invasion of South Korea. This miscalculation was probably based on three important factors: first, on 12 January 1950, the United States Secretary of State defined a defensive perimeter which did not include South Korea or Formosa; second, United States military forces had been slowly withdrawing from the mainland of Asia and the United States probably would not fight over South Korea; and third, the Navy-Air Force debate just completed in Congress indicated American military strategy centering on one kind of war--global atomic. With Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson reducing the Army and Navy, it became an acceptable risk for the Soviet Union to initiate a limited war.[2]

The immediate response of the United States[3] to the North Korean attack brought into operation its military

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[2]Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, "The Sea War in Korea" (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1957) pp. 22-23.

[3]Footnote 12 of Chapter I refers.

12. [illegible]

[illegible] the military power of the United States, in the [illegible] and possibly however, the U. S. Air Force and U. S. Navy made significant contributions in critical areas,

[illegible]

[illegible] the military power of the United States, in the [illegible] have greatly increase at the Soviet Union's [illegible] American reaction to the invasion of South Korea. This elaboration was perhaps best [illegible] first, on 11 January 1950, the United States Secretary of State defined a defensive perimeter which did not include South Korea or Formosa; second, United States military forces had been slowly withdrawing from the mainland of Asia and the United States probably would not fight over again Soviet and Asian, the Security Council [illegible] in Congress [illegible] American military strength [illegible] of one kind of war--global scale. With Secretary of [illegible] Air Defense evaluating the Army and Navy, it [illegible] be acceptable risk for the Soviet Union to initiate a limited war.[2]

The immediate response of the United States[3] to the North Korean attack brought into operation its military

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[2]Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, "The Sea War in Korea" (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1957), pp. 13-23.

[3]Footnote 12 of Chapter 3 refers.

forces against an overt power move of Communism.[4] For purposes of this paper, the importance of seapower principles exhibited in the initial phases of this campaign cannot be overstressed. Some of the major principles are: command of the sea, mobility, flexibility of weapons, and ease of command and control. In addition, the fleets normally operate in international waters, naval units provide good psychological tools, the fleet can provide a degree of ground support by Fleet Marine Forces and, in a limited sense, fleet operations can augment economic programs of the United States. An expanded discussion of these principles is found in Chapter V.

The above core concepts by no means are to be construed or interpreted that seapower alone will implement political decision when military forces are employed for such purposes. Comments regarding the effect of seapower in wars of past history are valid today for modern conflict. The eminent authority on seapower, E. B. Potter, states:

> The inconclusive results of these wars (Christian-Turkish Wars) underlined what had been demonstrated at Lepanto (naval campaign, October 1571): That while naval victories often make a decision possible, the final decision is usually reached on land.[5]

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[4]The initial naval operations are covered fully in Cagle and Manson, op. cit., Chapter II.

[5]E. B. Potter and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Sea Power (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1960), p. 19.

[illegible] doctrine to overly rewarded as [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

The importance and recognition of seapower can be readily demonstrated in the reactions of the U. S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in response to President Truman's request for advice on what course of immediate action to take in Korea. The Secretary of State's reply was to the effect: Direct General MacArthur (then Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Tokyo, Japan) to send all the ammunition he can spare to Korea, evacuate American dependents by air and ship, and deploy the Seventh Fleet to protect and neutralize Formosa.[6]

Further insight into the question of seapower as a political-military tool is made available by statements of General Douglas MacArthur wherein he recommended:[7]

1. Intensifying the economic blockade against China.
2. A naval blockade of the China coast.
3. Allowing air reconnaissance over Manchuria and the China coast.

Immediately after the death of General MacArthur, a sensational interview with him that took place in 1954 was published. In this interview, the General concisely demonstrated his knowledge of national interest, logistics and seapower. Regarding Korea, he said:

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[6]Beverly Smith, "The White House Story of Why We Went To War in Korea," Saturday Evening Post (November 10, 1951), p. 78.

[7]General Douglas MacArthur, Address to U. S. Congress, April 19, 1951, Congressional Record, Vol. 97, Part 3, p. 4123.

the Expeditions and Consolidation of Annexations must be
soundly commemorated in the erections of the U. S. Monument
of Peace, Drum Corsages, in celebrated Fashion's
response for advice on what colors be Democratic mauve is
made in Europe. The Secretary of Health's reply was to the
effect Detroit General Hospital Clean Surgeons Committee,
Little Rivers in Trade, Japan) to send all the Honorables to
one place in Korea, whereupon Americas Corporations by air and
ship, and deploy the Seventh Fleet to protect and Republics
Treaties."[6]

Further Congress take its question of Response to a
political-military bowl is made available by Statements of
General Douglas MacArthur Wednesday.[7]

1. Unfortunately the Democratic Missouri elected China.
2. A second Disciples of the China crowd.
3. Although its Encouragement over Manchuria and
the China crowds.

Immediately after the death of General Eisenhower, a commemorative Democratic with him took place in 1774 was Jubilation. In this Gallery, the General Electric Corporation's Life Insurance with Wife Club took place in 1774 was Jubilation. In this Gallery, the General Electric Corporation's Life Insurance of National Industry, Statistics and Surgeons Separating Force, he said.

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[6]Barely Satin, "The White House Story or Why We Must Go Out In Korea," Saturday Evening Post (November 10, 1951), p. 78.

[7]General Douglas MacArthur, Address to U. S. Congress, April 19, 1951, Congressional Record, Vol. 97, Part 3, p. 4123.

> Russia? It makes me laugh when I recall the fears of the Truman-Acheson-Marshall-Bradley general staff group that Russia would commit its armies to a war in China's behalf at the end of an endless one-track railroad to a peninsular battleground that led only to the sea.[8]

One of the key words is "peninsular" which allowed seapower to operate in conjunction with land and land-based airpower. In the same article, MacArthur's plan to protect Korea involved the use of Marines, amphibious landings and interestingly enough, a radio-active cobalt barrier across northern Korea from the Yellow Sea to the Sea of Japan. The cobalt barrier would have made Korea an island and created a most favorable geographic situation for defense by seapower somewhat analogous to that of Formosa.

In the opening phases of the Korean War, the United States Navy's role was quickly appreciated. One of the first problems was getting troops to Korea. MacArthur had four divisions in Japan. "He must keep 2 divisions in Japan. Any further troops needed will presumably have to be brought across 7,000 miles of sea lanes from the United States."[9] A second problem was that of air cover. South Korea had few airfields and only two paved runways. Aircraft starting

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[8]General Douglas MacArthur in an interview with reporter Bob Considine, Washington Post, April 8, 1964, p. 1.

[9]"The News of the Week in Review," The New York Times, July 2, 1950, p. 1E, section 4.

from Japan had limited range and little time could be spent over the battlefield.[10]

Almost immediately, the Seventh Fleet aircraft carriers took up the support of the ground forces. As early as July 3, 1950, the North Koreans were taken by surprise by an attack on Pyong-yang well above the 38th parallel by both propellor and jet aircraft from the U.S.S. Valley Forge.[11] Within three weeks after the conflict began, it was readily apparent that the Seventh Fleet needed more ships to fulfill its missions of: attacking the enemy, convoying troops to Korea, maintaining a blockade of North Korea and patrolling the Taiwan Straits as directed by the President of the United States.[12]

The principle of mobility[13] and its inherent advantages was clearly demonstrated at Inchon, Korea. This was the master stroke which after eighty-two days the UN ground forces were effectively relieved of the pressure on the Pusan perimeter.[14] Through the use of bold amphibious landings to outflank and cut logistic support, the United Nations forces

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[10] Ibid.

[11] Cagle and Manson, op. cit., pp. 37-39; and The New York Times, July 6, 1950, p. 8.

[12] New York Times, July 7, 1950, p. 5.

[13] Potter and Nimitze, op. cit., p. 867.

[14] "Invasion of Inchon," Time Magazine (September 1950), p. 26.

[illegible] Time [illegible] (September 1890), p. 26.

[illegible] Review of Reviews, XXII (December 1900), 667.

[illegible] Review of Reviews, XXII (December 1900), 667.

[illegible] New York Times, July 3, 1890, p. 5.

[illegible] Review of Reviews, XXII (December 1900), 667.

[illegible] New York Times, July 3, 1890, p. 5.

[illegible] New York Times, July 3, 1890, p. 5.

[illegible] Review of Reviews, XXII (December 1900), 667

spearheaded by American Marine units broke the North Korean Peoples Army.[15] General MacArthur's daring and great gamble at Inchon created a classic operation in the annals of military history.

The Korean War conclusively settled the burning arguments of 1948 and 1949 which centered around the aircraft carrier vs. the B-36.[16] For the period of the Korean War, the aircraft carrier was indispensable to the UN forces. It was quickly recognized that the United States had "over concentration on one kind of airpower (strategic atomic) at the expense of others (tactical and Navy)."[17] The Seventh Fleet and the American Air Force units in combat quickly became the verbal targets of Communist China. On August 24, 1950, Chou En-lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, sent a cable to the Secretary General of the United Nations stating: "The Seventh Fleet and contingents of the

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[15]For Marine Corps participation in the Korean War see: Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC, "U. S. Marine Operations in Korea," Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Historical Branch G-3, 1957, Vols. 1-3 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957).

[16]For a concise review of the issues at stake and the general strategic, tactical, and technical postures of the Navy and Air Force, see: Cagle and Malcolm, op. cit., pp. 14-22.

[17]Hanson Baldwin, "U. S. Errors in Korea," The New York Times, July 10, 1950, p. 7.

U. S. Air Force . . . [are] openly encroaching on the territory of China, etc."[18] By August 1951, the Peking-sponsored New China News Agency bitterly complained about air and naval strikes in the Yalu regions. A report by Jen-min jih-pao correspondent at Kaseong, Korea, August 5, 1951, states, "without air and naval forces the ground forces would be driven in the sea."[19] On August 8, 1951, the same source reported, "U. S. joint naval-air massacres of Korean civilians continues."[20]

Space does not permit more examples of the basic principles of seapower which were present in the Korean War. Needless to say, all principles were used with varying degrees of success and usefulness. In addition, the Korean War alerted the free world to the potential of Communist China. The fact that the Korean War had political objectives as well as military objectives was brought out early in the conflict.[21] One of the effects on the American people created by the Korean War was the awareness that war and conflict was being modified rapidly from the traditional

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[18] United Nations Document S/1715, dated August 24, 1950; or U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, p. 607.

[19] Survey of the Mainland Press, #149, August 6-8, 1951, p. 5.

[20] Ibid., #151, August 10, 1951, p. 4.

[21] John Foster Dulles, "Korean Attack Opens New Chapter in History," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, pp. 207-210.

concepts carried over from World War II. Among the concrete evidences of this was President of the United States Harry S. Truman's summary relief of his area commander, General Douglas MacArthur. By this action even the concept of victory was openly challenged. This was essentially a parallel to President of the United States Woodrow Wilson's plea on January 22, 1917, for a "peace without victory."[22] With the advent of atomic warfare, the question had arisen, "Can there be a meaningful victory within the context of total war?" The United States implied that the answer was--there will be no escalation of the Korean War even though it may deprive America of victory within the traditional concepts of the word.

III. TACHEN EVACUATION

As a prelude to serious pressure by the Peking Government on the United States over Formosa, the Communists stepped up propaganda and, to a degree, military action in mid-1954. U. S. naval elements assisted in the evacuation from North Viet-Nam of approximately one hundred thousand evacuees and refugees. This evacuation inspired confidence for the free peoples throughout Asia and gave eloquent

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[22]Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (seventh edition; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), p. 590.

[illegible]

testimony that the United States Navy was ever available for peaceful support as well as having a military mission in the Far East.[23] On July 22, 1954, two Communist Chinese fighter aircraft shot down an unarmed British airliner thirty miles south of Hainan Island in the South China Sea.[24] Almost immediately aircraft carriers of the Seventh Fleet were dispatched to the scene to "cover and protect" search and rescue operations.[25] On the 26th of July, Seventh Fleet aircraft promptly shot down two Communist Chinese aircraft which entered the search area. This action was applauded by members of Congress back in Washington, D. C.[26]

The Seventh Fleet's action in implementing American policy had a profound and sobering effect on Peking. The Communist Chinese version of the loss of two of their aircraft to American navy fighters was covered as follows:

> NCNA Peking, July 27, 1954.
> 09:25 Four U.S. naval fighter planes invaded China's territorial air over Port Yulin.
> 10:05 Twelve fighters above Loh Huei of Hai Nan Island shot down two Chinese patrol craft. Two fighters dived

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[23]"Exodus: Report on Voluntary Mass Flight to Freedom Viet-Nam, 1954," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 32, October 1954, pp. 222-229.

[24]This and other attacks were covered by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U. S. Representative to the United Nations, in U. S./U. N. Press release 1956, dated September 17, 1954.

[25]Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Department of State Press Release 406, July 26, 1954. Earlier coverage of the news story, The New York Times, July 25, 1954, p. 1.

[26]The New York Times, July 27, 1954, p. 1.

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[illegible] supports as well as meeting a military imperative to the
Far East."[22] On July 23, 1954, two Communist Chinese fighter
aircraft shot down an unarmed British airliner thirty miles
north of Hainan Island in the South China Sea.[23] Almost
immediately aircraft carriers of the Seventh Fleet were dis-
patched by the Navy to "cover and protect" search and rescue
operations.[24] On the 2nd of July, Seventh Fleet aircraft
reportedly shot down two Communist Chinese aircraft which
entered the search area. This action was applauded by mem-
bers of Congress back in Washington, D. C.[25]

The Seventh Fleet's action in implementing American
policy had a profound and lasting effect on Peking. The
Communist Chinese reaction at the time of two of their air-
craft by American navy fighters was covered as follows:

> Peking Radio, July 27, 1954.
> 09:25 Four U.S. naval fighter planes invaded China's
> territorial sky over Port Hsin.
> 10:05 Twelve fighters again came over at Hsi Hsu Island
> shot down two Chinese patrol craft. Two fighters strafed

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[22]"Eisenhower: Report on Voluntary Move Flight to Taiwan
Cited-Wire," 1954," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 32,
October 1954, pp. 533-539.

[23]Plus and other aircraft were covered by Henry Cabot
Lodge, Jr., U. S. Representative to the United Nations, in
U. S.U.N. Press release 1939, dated September 17, 1954.

[24]Decisions of State John Foster Dulles, Department
of State Press Release 458, July 26, 1954. Earlier Congress-
ional Record, July 23, 1954, p. 12

[25]The New York Times, July 27, 1954, p. 1.

> to strafe two Polish merchant and Chinese escort vessels. The fighters fled when anti-aircraft guns were fired in self defense.[27]

The article continues and deplores the frequent violations of Chinese territory by American forces.

By January 1955, six months after the Hainan Island affair, Red China again started aggressive moves. The amphibious assault on Yikiangshen Island in the vicinity of the Tachens was successful. President Eisenhower, taking cognizance of the threat to Far Eastern peace, requested Congress to grant him authority to use American military forces as he saw fit in the defense of Formosa, the Pescadores and such other areas as were considered necessary for the defense of Formosa.[8] This action was to be taken within the framework of the December 2, 1954, Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China. A treaty which by its Article X would "remain in force indefinitely."[29] Congress subsequently granted the President the power he requested with strong support. The issue was resolved by Congressional Joint Resolution 159, 84th Congress, 1st Session by the following vote: House of Representatives on

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[27] Survey of the Mainland Press, No. 857, July 28, 1954.

[28] Message from the President of the United States D. Eisenhower to Congress, January 24, 1955. House Document 76, 84th Congress, 1st Session, or Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 32, p. 213.

[29] For treaty text see: Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 31, p. 888.

to effect two fiscal measures and [illegible] against vested interests. The Keynesians also [illegible] their multi-directed [illegible] goals.[37]

The article continues and explores the proposed ramifications of Chinese hostility by American tycoons.

By January 1939, all worries over the Nazi-Soviet Pact affair, and China again assumed importance. The Washington Conference re Disarmament [illegible] in the interests of the Chinese [illegible] necessary.[38] President Hirschorn, touring Asia, [illegible] of the threats to Far Eastern peace, cryptically [illegible] be quick [illegible] necessity to use American military forces if [illegible] its [illegible] of Pacific, the [illegible] and other [illegible] considered necessary for the defense of America."[39] This action was to be taken within the framework of the December 1, 1921, Naval Limitations Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China." A treaty which by its Article 4 would "remain in force indefinitely."[40] Consequences subsequently produced the situation the Japs be [illegible] with already [illegible]. The issue was resolved by Congressional [illegible] 139, the "Hostages Act [illegible] Chinese by the following total. Monies of Reparations [illegible]

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[37] "Report of Sino Crossroad Trade," Vol. 827, July 14, 1939, [illegible] Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.

[38] Washington Files the Creation of the United States of China, Vol. 82, pp. 213.

[39] For treaty text see: Compilation of Arms Limitation, Vol. 11, p. 889.

January 25, 1955, vote in the affirmative 409-3. Senate on January 28, 1955, vote in the affirmative 85-3.[30]

On January 18, 1955, Secretary of State Dulles made statements to the effect that the Tachen Islands were not essential to the defense of Formosa, and that the Seventh Fleet would not take part in the fighting over these islands.[31] Thus, the stage was set for evacuation of the Tachens. The United States committed itself to the support of the Republic of China's redeployment of forces on February 5, 1955.[32] On the next day, the Seventh Fleet, including five aircraft carriers, was ordered to the Tachens.[33] On February 7, 1955, Peking condemned the participation of the Seventh Fleet and claimed the aircraft carriers had flown 2,224 sorties between January 24 and February 4, 1955, in support of Chiang Kai-shek.[34] The same day, a Department of Defense aid (unidentified) stated the United States was ready for "hot pursuit" of Communist forces if the evacuation were interfered with.[35] By February 8, 1955, the situation could

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[30] Ibid., Vol. 32, p. 213.

[31] Ibid., Vol. 32.1, pp. 191-192.

[32] Department of State Press Release No. 65 of February 5, 1955.

[33] The New York Times, February 6, 1955, p. 1.

[34] Ibid., February 7, 1955, p. 1.

[35] Ibid., February 8, 1955, p. 3.

be summed up as "The Chinese Communists are standing back a respectful distance as the United States Seventh Fleet proceeds with the evacuation of the Tachen Islands."[36] Thus, the Seventh Fleet successfully evacuated 17,127 civilians and 25,000 soldiers without incident under the ominous threat of Red Chinese retaliatory action.

The Peking point of view was that the Communist Party of China had achieved victories of "real significance for the final liberation of Taiwan and fully testified to the fact that no force was strong enough to obstruct the Chinese in their just struggle for the liberation of Taiwan and other islands off the mainland."[37]

IV. QUEMOY AND MATSU INCIDENT, AUGUST 1958

On the surface, this episode in history appears to have been a probing action, or gamble, by Red China to take over the Quemoy and Matsu Islands. It resulted in a failure. Sub-surface factors were the internal situation in Communist China, the aspirations of the "great leap forward," and whole Sino-Soviet relationship--all of which contributed to the Communist Chinese taking the initial overt moves. In

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[36] Ibid., p. 1.

[37] Ho Kan-Chih, "A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution," (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959), pp. 592-593. [English language.]

be erased by no "one Chinese Communists are recently born a
[illegible] determined as the Qatsi Sister Dennis rises pro-
ceeds with the implantation of the Tianma Islands."[36] Thus,
the Bennett River Reconnaissance[illegible] evaluated 17,127 citizens
and 25,000 existing airways including below the national
interest of the Chinese [illegible] decision.

The Peking point of view and that the Communist Party
of China had achieved significance at "least significance for
the first time[illegible] of Taiwan and fully benefited to the
fact that no Tibet was already enough to construct the Chinese
by their [illegible] for the liberation of Taiwan and
where Islands and the mainland."[37]

IV. CONFLICT AND MARITIME DISPUTES, AUGUST 1958

On the contrary, this solution is clearly opposite to
have been a possible action, or [illegible], by the China to keep
over the Communist Chinese islands. It resulted in a Taiping,
Wan-Hsien Chinese were the Nationalist situation in Communist
China, the negotiations of the "great Lake Covenant," and
Quemoy Ship-Control Reservation--all of which complicated to
the Communist Chinese during the initial seven months. In

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[36] [illegible] p. 13.

[37] Wan-Chih, "A History of the Modern Chinese Civilization," (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959), pp. 314-317. [Compiled Translation]

the end these sub-surface reasons received, with lasting effects, "fall-out" with its failure.

The timing of the Taiwan crisis was probably out of the major considerations of: the western involvement in the Middle East; the gross Chinese miscalculations of Soviet power (ICBM strength primarily);[38] and the extent to which the Soviets would support aggressive Red Chinese party moves towards Formosa.[39] A secondary consideration was to create support or at least non-resistance to the inauguration of the commune system. An external threat or goal would help build the badly needed cohesive forces for such a drastic measure.

The Taiwan government interpretation of the "Battle of Taiwan Straits" lists the following as Communist China's reasons for the action: (1) to test U. S. attitude on defense of the islands and the strength of the Republic of China to hold them; (2) to capture (Quemoy and Matsu) without costly landing operations by means of sea and air blockade; (3) create such an explosive international situation that the pressure on the Republic of China would force it to withdraw;

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[38]Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 85-98.

[39]Ibid., pp. 120-130.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

and (4) to drive a wedge between Taiwan and the United States.[40]

Failure of the United States to support the Republic of China at this time may have resulted in the Chinese Communists successfully challenging the principle that armed force must not be used for aggression; demonstrating to friend and foe alike that the United States was weak; creating a situation whereby the government of Taiwan may have fallen, jeopardizing a part of the United States western Pacific defense line; and greatly weakening the will of free nations all over the world to resist Communist pressure.[41]

The role of the Seventh Fleet in any attempt of the Communist Chinese to take over Formosa was early recognized. In 1950, it was thought the Chinese Communists were handicapped by lack of a navy, and there was no evidence the Russians would help. Intervention by the Seventh Fleet would effectively stop any invasion unless such an invasion was backed by Russia.[42] Yet the reaction of the United States to an invasion of Formosa by Communist China still appeared uncertain in 1954. When the Secretary of State was

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[40] China Yearbook 1959-1960 (Taipai: China Publishing Co., 1961), pp. 608-609. [English language].

[41] "The Strategy of Communist Advance," Department of State Press Release, No. 749, of December 12, 1958.

[42] Hanson Baldwin, The New York Times, June 28, 1950, p. 12.

and (3) to retain a border between Taiwan and the United States."[42]

Members of the Senate seeks to postpone the Republic of China as this time may have resulted in the Chinese Communists successfully challenging the principle that armed force must not be used for diplomatic bargaining to defend and the allies that the United States was willing to help a friendly government or Taiwan may have fallen, jeopardizing a part of the Taiwan Straits weapon, Fulbright believed that by actively maintaining the will of free nations all over the world to resist Communist pressure.[41]

The role of the Seventh Fleet is only example of the Communist Chinese to take over Formosa was partly responsible. In 1949, it was thought the Chinese Communists were supported by lack of a navy, and there was no evidence the Russians would help. Interruption by the Seventh Fleet would effectively stop any invasion was backed by bombs.[42] Yet the creation of the United States to an invasion of Formosa by Communist China still appeared unrealistic in 1954. When the Secretary of State was

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[41]"The Strategy of Commercial Advance," Department of State Press Release, No. 147, of December 12, 1951, p. 12.

[42]Hanson Baldwin, "The New Fact Peace," June 14, 1950, p. 1.

[43]United Statements 1950-1956 (Vol.). China Publishing Co., 1957, pp. 100-106. (English language).

asked at a news conference if the United States would counter an attack on Formosa by action against the mainland, Secretary Dulles replied, "not necessarily, retaliatory action [would be] limited in scope with regard to the gravity of the offense."[43] Three months later, Secretary Dulles made the following statement regarding Formosa. The defense of Formosa is "two distinct matters, first the political decision as to what to defend, then the decision as to how to defend . . . the political decision has been taken."[44]

The stage was set for intense pressure by the Chinese Communists on the Taiwan Straits area. As the pressure increased in August 1958, one of the main responses of the United States came in the form of the Seventh Fleet. As the Seventh Fleet increased the tempo of its operations, the Chinese mainland press increased its verbal abuse of the Fleet.

> Peking. Aug. 24, 1958. U. S. Air provocations . . . . shipping surveillance . . . air and surface patrols and use of U. S. Navy bombers.[45]

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[43]John Foster Dulles, News Conference, Department of State Press Release 686, December 1, 1954.

[44]John Foster Dulles, address to the nation over television and radio, March 8, 1955, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 32, p. 459.

[45]Survey of the Mainland Press, op. cit., No. 1841, p. 51.

"What is more contemptible in the United States would condemn one who objects on fetishes by making military the national, universally binding religion," "not unnecessarily," practically making [would the] [United be] simple [and] respect to the morality of the officers."[43] [Then] another [person], [necessary] action made the following statement regarding Russia. "The decision of Congress in [this similar matter], first the political] decision is to [be] [to defend], then the political] decisions] may be [to be defend] - ," the political decisions had been taken."[44]

The whole web for [between] pressures by the Chinese Communists on [the United States area]. In the [mounted in- creased] in August 1958, one of the main [explosions] of the United Peoples [Army] in the form of the Seventh "Fleet". As the Seventh Fleet [increased] the [edge] of its operations, the Chinese Nationalist forces [increased] its [moral] [power] at the [time].

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[43]Jean Edgar Hoover, [Some Conferences], [Department] of State Bulletin [1958], [September] 1, 1958.

[44]Dean Acheson [Speech], [delivered] to the American [Association] and Radio, March 8, 1951], [Department] of State Bulletin, Vol. 12, p. 435.

[43]Secret of the Pentagon [1958], pp. [12]-, esp. 1941, p. 21.

Peking. Aug. 26, 1958. Seventh Fleet combined naval exercise . . . raising tensions in Taiwan Straits.[46]

Peking. Sept. 7, 1958. Editorial Jen-min jih-pao. 600 million people mobilize to crush the U. S. aggressor.[47] A bitter denunciation of the Seventh Fleet.

Hoping to bring Soviet influence into the contest, Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev sent a personal letter to President of the United States Eisenhower. In this letter, he clearly shows his appreciation of seapower by his condemnation and derision of a surface fleet capability. He draws a parallel between the Seventh Fleet action in the Taiwan Straits and the Sixth Fleet in Lebanon. He stated that the naval maneuvers and marines constitute air and naval blackmail. Further, the surface fleet days are over and they serve no useful purpose except to pay visits, courtesy calls, give salutes and be a target for missiles. In addition, there can be no peace in the Far East until the Seventh Fleet is withdrawn.[48]

The key to the entire situation was centered around whether or not the offshore islands could be supplied. This, in turn, was dependent upon the effectiveness of the Communist blockade. The Peking evaluation of the logistical

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[46] Ibid., No. 1843, p. 25.

[47] Ibid., No. 1851, p. 3.

[48] Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 39-1, pp. 499-502. For President Eisenhower's reply of September 12, 1958, see White House Press Release (Newport, Rhode Island) of September 13, 1958.

situation for the islands seems reasonable. It was estimated that Quemoy alone needed 700 tons of supplies per day, yet received only 50 to 150 tons per day.[49] As the tension mounted, it became apparent that the Seventh Fleet would have to provide more than moral support. The decision was made that Seventh Fleet units would escort Chinese Nationalist vessels in the resupply of Quemoy in international waters.[50] The United States recognized and escorted to the three mile limit.[51] This was a calculated risk on the part of the United States as previously, on September 4, 1958, the Peking government had claimed a twelve-mile limit for its territorial waters.[52]

The Soviet reaction to the pressure on Quemoy and Matsu was clearly enunciated in Pravda on October 6, 1958:

> But we have not interfered in and do not intend to interfere in the civil war which the Chinese people are waging against the Chiang Kai-shek clique.
>
> The arrangement of their domestic affairs according to their own discretion is the inalienable right of every people. The intention to get back their islands of Quemoy and Matsu and to free Taiwan is the internal affair of the Chinese people.[53]

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[49] Time Magazine, September 29, 1958, p. 26.

[50] Department of State Press Release, No. 593, October 8, 1958.

[51] Ibid., No. 723, November 28, 1958.

[52] Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 211-212.

[53] Ibid., p. 216.

[illegible] for the Islands seems reasonable. It was restricted [illegible] Chinese coolies 100 tons or displacement and [illegible] per coolie to 10 cu ft [illegible] per day.[12] As the treaties [illegible] it appears highly that the Islands would [illegible] be provide more than local support. The duration and [illegible] Japan presents their point would reduce Chinese desire [illegible] in the possibility of Chinese in [illegible] markets.[10] The United States considered and assented to the [illegible] [illegible].[11] This was a calculated risk on the part of the United States as previously, on September 7, 1922, the [illegible] Government had claimed a twelve-mile limit for its territorial waters.[12]

The Soviet reaction to the Agreements on Chinese and Japanese was closely considered in Peking on October 6, 1922:

> But we have not interfered in and do not intend to interfere in the civil war which the Chinese people are waging against the United Provinces.

The acquiescence of their numerous officials accord- ing to [illegible] was [illegible] as [illegible] Japan in [illegible] of Chinese and Japan and by [illegible] to their own [illegible]. The intention to get into their [illegible] of western people. The [illegible] is the Washington [illegible] the Chinese people.[13]

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[12] Ibid., p. 410.

[13] "Soviet Opinion," The Chinese Christian Advocate, 3 (October 6, 1922), 1.

[14] Ibid., Nov. 111, November 28, 1922.

[15] Chinese Recorder, September 30, 1922, p. 32.

The Pravda statement made it quite clear to Peking that they could expect no support from Moscow. This Soviet attitude in all probability contributed to the deterioration of Peking-Moscow amity. It appears a prediction of 1955 was largely borne out by the end result of the crisis.

> We cannot afford to allow the Communists to exercise control of the sea routes around Quemoy. Not even for 24 hours.
>
> This matter of control and use of the sea approaches is the crucial question in the battle for Quemoy. The decision to attack will be largely guided by what the Communists feel will be the action of the United States on this aspect.[54]

The American buildup of naval strength in one month had 6 attack carriers and a 150-ship fleet on a war footing in Formosan waters. The quick assembly of such massive striking power through naval mobility may have been responsible for averting a major conflict.

Thus,

> . . . the U. S. Navy's [through the Seventh Fleet] demonstrated readiness to support America's Far Eastern allies brought a new prestige to the United States in that whole area, and a corresponding loss of face to Red China. As a consequence, it undoubtedly improved the bargaining position of the United States in its dealings with Allies and neutralist countries alike.[55]

In conclusion, the Quemoy and Matsu incident represents

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[54]Admiral Charles M. Cooke, USN (Ret.), "Quemoy: The Immediate Threat to the Peace," Colliers (October 14, 1955), p. 74.

[55]Potter and Nimitze, op. cit., p. 881.

The [illegible] statement made it quite clear to Hitler that they could expect no support from Moscow. This Soviet attitude in all probability overlooked by the determination of Hitler-Moscow amity. It appears a realization of 1921 was largely borne out by the end result of the crisis.

> We cannot afford to allow the Communists to acquire control of the sea routes except temporary. Not even for 24 hours.

> This matter of control and use of the sea approaches is the crucial question in the battle for Germany. The Bolsheviks to attack will be largely guided by what the Communists [illegible] will be the action of the United States on this aspect.[34]

The American building of naval strength in sea mastership a great curtain and a 150-ship fleet on a war footing is foreseen easier. The quick assembly of such massive striking power through naval mobility may have been responsible for averting a major conflict.

Thus,

> . . . the U. S. Navy's [illegible] the Atlantic Fleet] emphatically continues to support Americ's far Eastern allies brought a new position to the United States in that world area, and a corresponding laws of face to Red China. As a consequence, it tremendously improved the bargaining position of the United States in its dealings with Allied and neutrals' countries alike.[35]

In conclusion, the Dewey and Byrnes [illegible] recommend

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[34]Admiral Charles B. Cooke, USN (ret.), "Dewey: The Immediate Threat to the Times," Collier's (October 15, 1938), p. 74.

[35]Foster and Eidsmo, op. cit., p. 681.

a clear-cut political victory for the United States and a serious setback for Peking. The ramifications of this defeat within the Sino-Soviet block take on greater significance daily. This major political victory was achieved almost solely through the application of seapower in the form of the Seventh Fleet.

V. THE FORMOSAN QUESTION

The Formosan problem is one of the most controversial issues facing the United States political planners.

> The crisis in the Formosa Strait arises from the fact that Nationalist China is committed to holding on to the offshore islands as well as to Formosa and the Pescadores, and Communist China is committed to acquiring them . . . . Talk of neutralizing the offshore islands sounds reasonable to many non-Chinese, but it is unacceptable to either Peking or Taiwan . . . if Chiang approves the neutralization of the offshore islands, he will have to renounce his goal of returning to the mainland . . . and if Mao accepts such a program he faces the prospect of never attaining his territorial goals which it is believed include the taking over of Formosa.[56]

Regardless of the issues involved, the political decision to prevent Red China from taking over Formosa has been made. The primary military tool to insure accomplishment of this decision is the Seventh Fleet.

> Taiwan, with its 11 million people, is more than just an island. It is a country, more populous than

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[56]Neal Stafford, "Tug of War of Two Chinas," Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. 38, No. 3 (October 15, 1958), p. 19.

a clear-cut political victory for the United States, and a
serious setback for Beijing. The resolutions of this ses-
sion validate the Clinton-Soviet thesis on greater stabili-
zation duality. This major political victory was publicized
almost solely through the application of analysis in the
Case of the Bermuda Plans.

V. The Processor Question

The Processor problem is one of the most controversial
issues facing the United States political planners.

The values in the Processor Soviet actions drag the
last link Washington China is committed to holding
on to the Philippines Islands as well as to Formosa and
the Peninsular, and Communist China is committed to
defending them . . . Talk of neutralizing this off-
shore island would reasonably be ready anti-Chinese,
but it is unacceptable to either leading or Taiwan . . .
it could aggravate the destabilization of the Pacific
Islands, he will have to reckoning his goal of eliminating
to the maximum . . . and if Mao Zedong made a stronger
to change the background or never withdrew his hostile-
torial ports which is to believed Formosa the reading
over of Formosa."[56]

Perpetuated of the leading Democrats, the political deci-
sion to guarantee that China also Taiwan Processor has been
made. The defense military tool to insure acceptablement of
this decision is the Taiwanese Treaty.

Taiwan, with its 21 million people, is more than
just an island. It is a country, more populous than

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[56]Paul Bledsom, "Plug of War of Two China," Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vols. 34, No. 3 (December 15, 1931), p. 47.

> half of the members of the United Nations; and it is a symbol. Nowhere else in the Western Pacific is the value of the Seventh Fleet quite so clear and final. You can look at Taiwan and say with certainty: "Here are 11 million people who would not belong to the Free World now, if it were not for the existence of the Seventh Fleet."[57]

One particularly pessimistic view concerning American Formosan policy states:

> The fact is that when the American Government in 1950 sent the Seventh Fleet to Far Eastern waters to guarantee Formosa against attack by the Communists, who had just gained control of the mainland, we gave a hostage that cannot be redeemed except at a cost certainly disastrous and perhaps fatal.[58]

American policy has not always supported the Nationalist cause on Formosa. In early 1950, the United States had completely abandoned Chiang Kai-shek to the extent that the U. S. Department of State expected the fall of Formosa to the Chinese Communists in the near future.[59] Today, although the United States is committed to help defend Formosa, America would not, and in fact could not, oppose a general desire for unification with Communist China.[60]

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[57] William H. Hessler, "Blue Water Around Red China," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1963), p. 38.

[58] Nathaniel Peffer, "Should Our Formosan Policy Be Changed?" Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. 34, No. 5 (November 15, 1954), p. 38.

[59] G. F. Hudson, "The Two Chinas," Current History, July 1956, p. 2.

[60] Michael Lindsay, "A New China Policy: Difficulties and Possibilities," The China Quarterly, April-June, 1962, p. 61.

half of the members of the United Nations, and it is a symbol. Anything else in the Western Pacific is the victim of the Kremlin plant quite so clear and clean. You can look at Indonesia and say with certainty: "There are 11 million people who would not belong to the Communist bloc, if it were not for the existence of the Chinese Wall."[7]

One particularly pessimistic view concerning American foreign policy stated:

> The fact is that when the American Government in 1950 sent the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan waters to practically remove any threat to the Communists, who had just gained control of the mainland, in spite of a treaty that cannot be reasoned except as a pact executively disastrous and perhaps fatal,[8]

American policy has not always supported the Declaration that China is foreign." In early 1950, the United States and successively sanctioned Chiang Kai-shek to its island base the U. S. Department of State announced the fall of Formosa to the Chinese Communists in the near future.[9] Today, although the United States is committed to help defend Formosa, American public and, and in fact could not, approve a general ceasing the negotiations with Communist China.[10]

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[7] William H. Hessler, "Slow Water Through Red China," U.S. News [Internet Technology] (February 1952), p. 32.

[8] Editorial Letter, "Should Our Overseas Policy Be Changed?" Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. 34, No. 7 (November 15, 1954), p. 10.

[9] C. P. Trussell, "The Two China," Current History, July 1950, p. 3.

[10] "Chinese Lobbying," A New China Policy, Life Magazine and Newsweek Editions," The China Quarterly, April-June, 1955, p.

The two primary military supporting elements to Formosa are the Seventh Fleet and units of the United States Air Force. The role of the U. S. Air Force is to a large degree a psychological threat of atomic warfare and in a lesser capacity it provides training and aid to the Nationalist Air Force. The Seventh Fleet provides Taiwan Straits patrol, and a major capacity for retaliation in the event of overt aggression on the part of Communist China in both atomic and conventional air strikes for the full range of the China coast. In addition, it also doubles in training with the Nationalist forces. The extent of the military activity can be seen from the fact that during the period January 1961 to March 1962 the Peking government issued its 131st to 193rd warning to the United States over American "military intrusions." Involved were twenty-six warships including submarines--and the remainder of the violations were aircraft "violating" Kwangtung or Fukien Provinces.[61]

One view of the Seventh Fleet is that it was the only way Chiang Kai-shek could be supported. A pure façade is to say it is to keep the Nationalists from returning to the mainland.[62] Yet, a casual sampling of Nationalist Chinese

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[61] Communist China Year Book (Hong Kong: China Research Associates, 1963), pp. 575-576. Extracts from the Peking Review No. 4, January 26, 1962.

[62] Claude A. Buss, "The Arc of Crisis," (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1961), pp. 65-66.

the two primary military requirements appear to
[illegible] are the adequacy [illegible] and maintenance of the United States
air force. The role of the U.S. air force is to a large
degree a psychological threat of atomic warfare and is a
lesser capacity to provide security and aid to the National
allied air forces. The Taiwan Fleet provides Taiwan strategic
patrol, and a major capacity for neutralization in the event of
naval operations on the part of communist China is here
absent and conventional air strikes for the full range of
the China coast. In addition, it also contains in training
with the Nationalist forces. The extent of the military
activity can be seen from the fact that during the period
January 1951 to March 1952 the Peking government issued its
title to 19[illegible] warning to the United States over American
"military intrusions." Involved were twenty-six warning
[illegible] overflights—and the remainder of the violations
were alleged "violating" Communist or Nation Provinces.[61]

The view of the Taiwan Fleet is that it was the only
way China Nationalists could be supported. A pure façade is to
say it is to keep the Nationalists from retreating to the
mainland.[62] But, a casual sampling of Nationalist Chinese

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[61] Communist China Base Book (Hong Kong: China Weekly Affairs Association, 1951), pp. 272-273. Reference from the United States Navy, No. 4, January 26, 1951.

[62] Claude A. Buss, "The Lure of Crisis," (Chicago: Chicago Sunday and Co., 1951), pp. 82-86.

news media indicate the extent of the raids conducted against the mainland. Nationalist claims are:

> From March 1962 to October 1963 - 1,785 guerrilla agents to the mainland.
>
> From June to October 1963--32 Commando raids.[63]
>
> October 1963 - 21 new Commando raids on the mainland.[64] In 1963 the Chinese Communists have admitted to 14 anti-Communist guerrilla groups in Kwangtung Province.[65]

If the Nationalists' claims are true, it appears the Seventh Fleet acts as a barrier to Communist China's aims vis-à-vis Formosa and as a "one way filter" to agents and raiders from Taiwan.

The Seventh Fleet's activities as a training unit for the Nationalists is exploited fully. Among recent exercises were operations "Big Dipper" and "Blue Star." The month-long Sino-American amphibious exercise with the Seventh Fleet in February 1964, named "Operation Back Pack," consisted of fully integrated naval and marine units of both Nationalist and Seventh Fleet forces.[66]

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[63] Chinese News Service [New York, New York], Vol. NN-LXIII-48, November 26, 1963, p. 4.

[64] Free China Review (Taipai, Taiwan), Vol. XIII, No. 10, p. 81, October 1963. [English language].

[65] Free China Weekly [New York, New York], Vol. NN-LXIV-1, January 7, 1964, p. 4.

[66] Ibid., Vol. NN-LXIV-7, February 18, 1964, p. 4.

[illegible] indicates they worked at the radio broadcasting station
the weekend. Periodically during week
[illegible] began March 1923 to October 1923 operating
against the national.

From June to October 1923—32 commercials radio[63]

October 1923 - 23 new Commercial radio on his radio-
[illegible]. In 1923 the Columbia Broadcasting News Advertised
in 12 anti-Communist pamphlets [illegible] Broadcasting
Stations.[64]

By the beginning[illegible] claims are known, it opposed the Jeremiah
Flagg made an a Decision to Commercial Casino's plans [illegible]
Protocol and as a "One-way Filter" to examine and [illegible] from
Plaines.

The Reverend Bloodie originated as a Brooklyn host for
the negotiations in Moscow[illegible] Among Reverend Broadcast
Wave operations [illegible] and "Blue Star". The Soviet-
long Step-Dancing negotiators associate with the Reverend
Flagg in February 1924, named "Operation Deep Sea", Dope-
ahead of Daily interpreted naval and marine units of Deep
Intelligence and Overseas Flank Forces.[65]

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[63] Chicago Daily American [New York, New York], Vol. [illegible]-XX, November 12, 1923, p. 4.

[64] Free Radio Service (Federal Bulletin), Vol. XXII, No. 19, p. 81, October 1923. [illegible language].

[65] Radio Trade Monthly [New York, New York], Vol. [illegible]-I, February 7, 1924, p. 4.

[66] Radio; Vol. [illegible]-X, February 14, 1924, p. 4.

It is readily apparent that the United States is fully committed to the support of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government on Formosa for the immediate future. Of all the arguments for our present policy, among the strongest logic presented is:

> What acually makes Taiwan important is that it provides a demonstration under Chinese conditions that reformist policies can be far more effective than Communist policies in improving the conditions of the masses.[67]

Perhaps our policies regarding Formosa and Communist China would be more acceptable to our allies in the free world by modifying our present posture to conform more closely to the actuality of the situation.

> Only when we start to move off dead center in East Asia, beginning with the creation and implementation of imaginative policies based on the reality of two Chinas, will we start to exert a constructive influence on the shape of events to come.[68]

In summation, the political issues surrounding the Formosan question are many and can be argued with forcefulness; however, the decision to support Nationalist China was made, the Seventh Fleet was selected as the primary military tool to implement the decision, and it has successfully met the Chinese Communist pressures.

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[67] Lindsay, op. cit., p. 61.

[68] Chester Bowles, "The 'China Problem' Reconsidered," Foreign Affairs, April 1960, p. 486.

It is readily apparent that the United States is fully committed to the support of Peking Nationalist and the Nationalist government on Formosa as the immediate initiator of all the arguments for our present policy, namely the strategic logic presented in:

> that actually makes Taiwan important is that it provides a communications unit for Chinese communications that realistic policies can be far more effective than Communist policies in improving the conditions of the masses.[67]

Faithful are political regarding Taiwan's and Communist China should be more acceptable to one sitting in the free world by emptying one present postures to conform more closely to the actuality of the situation.

> only means we expect to solve our great problem in East Asia, beginning with the correction and implementation of Communistic policies based on the reality of Red China, will we start to avert a confrontation between us the shape of events to come."[68]

In summation, the political issues surrounding the Formosan question are many and can be argued with forcefulness; however, the solution to support Nationalist China was made, the Taiwan issue was subjected to the primary military tool to implement the decision; and it has successfully met the Chinese Communist challenge.

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[67] Lindsay, op. cit., p. 61.

[68] Charles Young, "The China Problem Reconsidered," Foreign Affairs, April 1960, p. 448.

VI. SEATO AGREEMENTS

SEATO was forged by Secretary of State Dulles in the period when American defense posture relied on "massive retaliation." The unilateral burden was placed squarely on the United States, and the fact that no American ground forces were to be used was made clear to Congress.[69] On March 8, 1955, Secretary of State John F. Dulles conducted a radio-television report to the nation in which he said:

> SEATO's ability to repel attack is based on the retaliatory power of mobile American air and sea forces plus native armed forces.[70]

In Southeast Asia the problem is not to counter the overt power moves of aggressor nations but rather the erosion by subversion and indirect aggression. This is recognized by Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.[71] In view of the nature of the military problem in the area and that the United States is to provide no ground troops, many Southeast Asian nations can question the value of SEATO.

The alliance has produced some military advantage. It

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[69]Norman A. Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960 (Princeton: Nostrand, Inc., 1962), pp. 94-97.

[70]Department of State Press Release, No. 131, March 8, 1955.

[71]For complete treaty text, see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 31, pp. 393-396.

43. SEATO Commitments

SEATO was forced by Secretary of State Dulles in the period when American defense policies relied on "massive retaliation." The initialed Pacific nations plus Britain, the United States, and the Czech bloc by American pressure would be used only to defend Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia.[63] On March 8, 1955, secretary of State John F. Dulles declared a radio-television address to the nation in which he said:

> SEATO's ability to expel attack is known on the [illegible] Pacific plus nations armed forces.[64]

In Southeast Asia the problem is not to combine the great power moves of aggressive nations but rather the action by subversion and internal aggression. This is recognized by Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.[65] In view of the nature of the military problem in the area and that United States is to provide no ground forces, many Southeast Asian nations question the value of SEATO.

The military has provided some military advantage, it

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[63] Norman A. Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960 (Princeton: Nostrand, Inc., 1962), pp. 26-27.

[64] Department of State Press Release, No. 111, March 8, 1955.

[65] The complete text, see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 32, pp. 337-338.

has made possible joint planning and training, exchange of intelligence, standardization of weapons, and military doctrine, and improvement of base facilities.[72] As early as the third year of its existence, SEATO exercises involved Seventh Fleet participation. In 1958, a report was made that of the five major military exercises completed, three involved sea forces.[73] These exercises, of course, expand in scope and complexity as experience dictates and they have been of a continuing nature.

The Seventh Fleet makes a unique contribution to the SEATO nations' sense of security. By its mobility, it can be present in time of crisis and, in addition, it frequently makes good-will visits to the area. This is tangible acknowledgment to the peoples of the SEATO countries that the United States is ready to uphold its pledge to support their independence. Due to this mobility, the Seventh Fleet frequently is under verbal attack by the Communists. Chinese Communist Chou En-lai said the American Navy "threatens the peace of southeast Asia."[74] Jen-min jih-pao demands the "U. S. Navy to get out of Singapore";[75] and the Peking Review

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[72] A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 136.

[73] Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 38.1, pp. 509-516.

[74] Survey of the Mainland Press, op. cit., No. 1841, August 22, 1958, p. 49.

[75] Ibid., p. 50.

[illegible] made possible joint planning and training, exchange of intelligence, standardization of weapons, and military doctrine. Some improvement in these facilities,[12] as well as the total year of its existence, their eventual removal [illegible] political climate. In 1960, a report was issued [illegible] military exercises completed, there [illegible] see [illegible][13] these exercises, at present, [illegible] be made completely de-nuclear [illegible] base of a continuing nature.

The Harvard Plans Model a natural continuation to the [illegible] needs of security. By its mobility, it can be present in time of crisis and, by [illegible], it presently [illegible] to the scene. This is especially [illegible] commitment to the [illegible] the Inter-American [illegible] United States it ready to [illegible] [illegible] intervention. Due to this mobility, the Harvard Plans [illegible] currently in [illegible] by the [illegible]. Obviously [illegible] close [illegible] the American Navy [illegible] [illegible] peace of mutual [illegible].[14] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] "A" Navy to [illegible] [illegible][15] and the [illegible]

---

[12] [illegible], "Communist China and Asia [illegible] Asian Society, 1959), p. [illegible].

[13] [illegible] of Using Military, Vol. XXVII, pp. 209-214.

[14] [illegible] of the National Forces [illegible], 86th, 1961, August 21, 1959, p. 18.

[15] [illegible], p. 20.

March 2, 1962, complains that the United States is getng bolder and more unscrupulous in their intervention and gression in South Viet-Nam with "U. S. warships on operaonal duty day and night along the coast."[76]

In summation, from the practical military problem int of view, it is reasonable to say:

> In any realistic sense . . . SEATO's strength consists almost wholely of what is injected by the five outside powers, the United States, Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand.[77]

y political agreements of SEATO, the Seventh Fleet was iven added stature and responsibility. Considering the trength of the so-called "outside powers" previously mentioned, the lion's share of the responsibility would evolve to the Seventh Fleet as the U. S. Air Force has few support bases to accommodate extensive operational commitments for a conventional war in behalf of the SEATO nations.

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[76] Communist China Yearbook, 1962, op. cit., p. 486.

[77] Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Thoughts Along the China Border; Will Neutrality Be Enough?," Foreign Affairs (January 1960), p. 245.

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76 *Commercial Cities Section*, 1941, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

77 "Austin Plan Approved," *Progress Along the Cabin Borders will Depend...*" *Chamber Affairs* (January 1950), p. 211.

CHAPTER III

THE CHANGING NATURE OF POWER VIS-À-VIS THE SEVENTH FLEET

I. SEVENTH FLEET CAPABILITY AS A POLITICAL-MILITARY TOOL

Technology in the atomic age has completely revised thinking regarding an all-out total national war effort such as we exerted in World War II. Because of today's weapons, "War has become less useful as a policy; due to heavy overtones and threat of 'total war'"; the political elements have developed greater control over the military forces; war will take greater emphasis in roles of insurgency and counter-insurgency (which may or may not act as wars "by proxy" for the great powers); and mutually agreed sanctuaries will be recognized by the combatants through their patterns of action in the attempt to prevent escalation and to localize the conflict--if the powers involved fear "total war."[1]

It is important to define clearly power at this point. "Power" as used here is "power" in the narrow sense--military power of a coercive nature. Other forms of power are:

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[1]Captain E. Amme, USN (Ret.), "The Changing Nature of Power," Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1963, pp. 5-11.

power of a coercive nature." Other forms of power may

"power," or make room in "power" in the minutes exercise-utilized

If it [division] do nothing else, it will [power] to

the [utility—]if the former [utility] [power] is

evolving by the [corporate] structure [patterns of

[corporate] [rights and naturally] [power] exercise will be

[corporate] rights and or may not be [power] [by right]. Be-

sides [exercise] [rights] the [corporate] [power] [by right]

[power] and [power] of [right not..."] the [rights] [power]

[the Section] [are] [power] [a] [right] [be to power] exer-

be be [power] [by July 12, [exercise of [power] [power],

[rights] [power] [power] [power] and [power] [power]

[exercise] [power] [power] [power] [power] [power]

V [CORPORATE-UTILITY] [POWER]

[A [POWER] [POWER] [POWER] [POWER]

[THE [POWER] [POWER]

[AND [POWER] [POWER] [POWER]

CHAPTER XII

economic power, diplomatic power, the power to generate consensus on the world scene, etc.

In spite of the awesome force of nuclear weapons, conflict and instability confront us everywhere.

> The threat of nuclear war did not stop small wars, border conflicts and peripheral struggles. An overdependence upon nuclear deterrence hampered our diplomacy, reduces flexibility, places too much military effort on a strategy we would be most reluctant to implement. The nuclear age has increased the demand for variety and versatility--we must have a flexible strategy, freedom of choice, alternative of action . . . .[2]

The truth of this statement can be substantiated by reference to Table I, infra, p. 62.

From the above, it is clear that man's reason and morality are slowly catching up with his scientific ability to control the forces of nature. Total war has become outmoded because in the nuclear age there can be no meaningful victory. Restraint is essential and the selection of military means is a political decision which is properly the responsibility of political leaders--not the military. This latter concept was forcefully imposed during the Korean War by the summary relief of General Douglas MacArthur from command of the prosecution of the war.

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[2]Hanson Baldwin, New York Times Magazine, August 18, 1957. Also see, "The Interrelationship of Military Power and Foreign Policy," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 31, August 1954, pp. 291-294.

economic power, diplomatic power, the power to generate con-

sensus on the world scene, etc.

In spite of the massive threat of nuclear weapons,

conflict and international rivalries do exist.

> The threat of nuclear war did not stop small wars,
> border conflicts and peripheral skirmishes. As weapons
> developments upset nuclear deterrents, deprived the
> diplomacy, reduced flexibility, place too much reli-
> ance effort on a strategy we would be most reluctant
> to implement. The nuclear age has increased the
> demand for everyday war-fighting—one must have a
> flexible strategy. Examples of choice, alternative of
> action ... ."

The thrust of this statement can be substantiated by reference

to Table 1, supra, p. 62.

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morality are slowly catching up with his scientific ability

to construct the forces of power. Until and not before suc-

cessful progress in the nuclear age there can be meaningful

victory. Peaceful is essential and the achievement of mili-

tary means it a political relation must be judged the

reasonableness of political leaders--not the military. This

nation somehow has successfully imposed moral the views of

Judeo Christian ethic upon the military establishment. Even

and Truman policy," Yale Institute of International Studies, Memo. 31, August 1954, pp. 113-124.

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[2] "Nuclear Weapons," New York Times Magazine, August 16, 1953. Also see, "The Uncertainty of War," Harper's Magazine, 1951.

TABLE I

LIMITED WARS AND CRISES SINCE WORLD WAR II[a]

DATE	INCIDENT	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS	COMMUNISTS DIRECTLY INVOLVED
1945-47	Indonesian War	280,000	No
1945-49	Chinese Civil War	3,200,000	Yes
1945-54	Malayan War	185,000	Yes
1945-54	War in Indochina	835,000	Yes
1945-?	Berlin Crises	Unknown	Yes
1946-49	Greek Civil War	236,000	Yes
1947-49	Kashmir Dispute	153,000	No
1948-49	Arab-Israeli War	205,000	No
1950-53	Korean War	2,149,000	Yes
1954	Guatemalan Revolt	14,000	Yes
1955	Argentine Revolt	56,000	No
1955-59	Revolt on Cyprus	Unknown	No
1956	Invasion of Egypt and Suez	217,000	No
1956	Hungarian Revolt	120,000	Yes
1956-59	Cuban Revolution	50,000	Suspected
1956-59	Revolt in Tibet	Unknown	Yes
1956-62	Algerian War	520,000	No
1957	Insurrection in Muscat/ Oman	3,000	No
1958	Lebanon-Jordan-Iraq Crisis	35,000 (Est.)	No
1958	Quemoy/Taiwan Strait Crisis	395,000	Yes
1959-?	Guerrilla Warfare in Cuba	Unknown	Yes
1959-?	Sino-Indian Border Dispute	Unknown	Yes
1959-?	Guerrilla War in Laos	Unknown	Yes
1960-?	Congo Crisis	30,000 (Est.)	Yes
1960-?	Guerrilla War in South Vietnam	270,000 (Est.)	Yes
1961	Revolt in Angola	20,000 (Est.)	No
1961	Dominican Republic Crisis	20,000 (Est.)	No
1961	Crisis in Kuwait	12,000 (Est.)	No
1961	Invasion of Goa	15,000 (Est.)	No
1962-?	War in West New Guinea	Small	No
1962-?	Revolt in Yemen	Unknown	Unknown
1962	Quarantine of Cuba	Unknown	Yes

[a]LCDR Robert H. Gormley, USN, "Limited War and the Striking Fleets," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1963), p. 55.

TABLE 2

ARMIES AND DATES SINCE WORLD WAR II[a]

DATE	ENCOUNTER	NUMBER OF VARIOUSLY	COMMENTS & PRACTICE INDICATED
1945-47	Indonesian War	380,000	Ne
1945-49	Chinese civil war	3,100,000	Cha
1945-54	Malayan War	150,000	Ma
1945-54	War in Indochina	833,000	Ina
1945-	Berlin Crises	Continuous	Ina
1948-49	Israel civil war	234,000	Isr
1947-49	Kashmir dispute	193,000	In
1948-49	Arab-Israeli war	203,000	Ma
1950-53	Korean War	3,149,000	Kor
1954	Guatemalan Revolt	14,000	Gua
1955	Argentine Revolt	30,000	Ar
1955-59	Revolt on Cyprus	Unknown	Cy
1956	Invasion of Egypt and Sinai	417,000	Sa
1958	Hungarian Revolt	120,000	Hun
1958-59	Cuban Revolution	50,000	Insurgents
1958-59	Revolt in Tibet	Unknown	Tib
1958-63	Algerian War	530,000	Alg
1957	Insurrection in Muscat/ Oman	3,000	Mu
1958	Lebanese-Jordan-Iraq Crisis	35,000 (Iraq)	Jo
1959	Quemoy/Taiwan Israel Crisis	385,000	Tai
1959-1	Guerrilla Warfare in Cuba	Unknown	Cub
1959-1	Sino-Indian Border Dispute	Unknown	Ind
1959-1	Guerrilla War in Laos	Unknown	Lao
1960-	Congo Crisis	20,000 (Cong.)	Con
1960-	Guerrilla War in South Vietnam	278,000 (Sou. Viet.)	Sou
1961	Revolt in Angola	20,000 (Port. Gui.)	An
1961	Indonesian Expedition Orbis	20,000 (Indo.)	Ne
1961	Crisis in Kuwait	12,000 (Kuw.)	Ku
1961	Invasion of Goa	12,000 (Port. Ind.)	Go
1962-	War in West New Guinea	Small	Ne
1962-	Revolt in Yemen	Unknown	Unknown
1962	Guerrillas of Cuba	Unknown	Cub

[a]Lucian Pabbert H. Conroy, "Wars, Limited War and the Practical Viewpoint," D. C. Heath Limited Incorporated (February 1962), p. 25.

What relevance then does the Seventh Fleet have as a general military tool today?

First is deterrence. The Seventh Fleet represents immediate nuclear and conventional strike capability which augments the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Polaris weapons systems. This is most important as the Seventh Fleet confronts the world's most dynamic revisionist power--Communist China.

Second is control of the sea. Logistic support of any land or sea military action is critically dependent upon unfettered lines of communication. Control of the sea insures our unrestricted use of the sea to implement political decision, while at the same time denying that privilege to an enemy.

Third, the Marine Corps element of the Seventh Fleet provides immediate response combined with conventional weapons of naval air power to establish beachheads or support local governments.

Fourth is mobility. The complete range of target complexes in Asia are a matter of a few hours steaming to bring the full and sustained power of the Seventh Fleet to bear.

Fifth, flexibility. One Forrestal-class carrier has the atomic weapon striking power equivalent to all conventional ordnance expended by all combatants during the entire

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Being the Last and Internal Power of the Defense Aided to
Completed in Late and a Better of a Ten Hours Planning In
Deep Inner Communities.

Tactical Operations Company with Conventional
Weapons of Naval Air Power to Watching Developed or Mo-
bile Inner Communities.

Today, the Docking Code element of the Damaged Plane
to Study.

Change: Radio at the same time Supplied Flak Fighters to
Every One Unmanicured map in the War to Implement Political
Related Lines of Communications. Control of the War In-
dependent Use Assigned Acting 12 Critically Important Use
Based In Control of the War, Supplies Airpower of
Planes the Warfare most Dynamic Capabilities Power—Command
Defense. This is most Important to the Damaged Plane Com-
pounds the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Allied Headquar-
ters Military Unit Today!

Flash 12 Conversion: The Defender Flight Exam as a
Summary Writers Unit Today!

World War II period and, at the same time, as an independent striking unit retains the capability to maintain normal sustained conventional air strikes on assigned station for a three-day period without replenishment.[3]

In the post-World War II period, the validity of each of the capabilities has been challenged with the exception of the Seventh Fleet's contribution in a total war situation. One can assume, however, this latter capability, though not challenged, has given pause to potential aggressors in the Far East to limit their ambitions.

A further comment on general seapower considerations was given by Admiral Radford as a primer on naval power:

> Historically seapower is the most mobile and therefore the most economical of military force. For 3,000 years or more, navies fought on the two dimensional ocean surface. The carrier-based plane gave navies the third dimension of the air. It has given them a sort of fourth dimension (1950)--a sweep of 500 miles [today (1964) over 1,200 miles] or more from any coast. Nearly all economic and political power centers in the world lie within 500 miles of deep water.[4]

In conclusion, with regard to the current world political milieu and fleet capability, two classical stories involving the Sixth Fleet (the Mediterranean counterpart of the Seventh Fleet) are told. The principles involved in

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[3]U.S.S. INDEPENDENCE (CVA-62) capability briefing lecture (unclassified) given visiting dignitaries and members of the press, 1961.

[4]From an article about Admiral Radford, USN, Time Magazine (September 11, 1950), p. 39.

world use it existed and, at the same time, be an independent existing unit retains the capability to maintain normal commercial communications on sealanes during [illegible] days of a three-day period without replenishment.[4]

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[5] From an article about Admiral Radford, USN, Time Magazine (September 11, 1950), p. 30.

these stories apply equally well to the Seventh Fleet. The first concerns the Suez Crisis of 1956 wherein the Sixth Fleet was alerted to intervene and restore stability in the area if necessary. Upon receipt of rather detailed but, at the same time, ambiguous orders due to the extremely tender situation involving our NATO allies, Admiral "Cat" Brown, Commander, Sixth Fleet, moved into the trouble zone almost immediately, and with complete candor reported to the Pentagon words to the effect, "the Sixth Fleet is ready for any contingency--whose side are we on?"[5]

The second story regards capability and the Lebanese crisis. As it was told, President Eisenhower asked senior military advisers what could be expected of each of the services in response to the crisis. The Chief of Staff for the Air Force gave an estimate of a week or so to deploy a tactical fighter squadron with all its logistical support from Germany, and the Army Chief of Staff said essentially the same thing to move a battalion or some other unit of comparable size. When Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, was asked what the Navy could do, he replied,

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[5]This incident received wide publicity among officers and men of the Sixth Fleet and was generally accepted as true at the time.

[illegible]

[illegible]

"Nothing--we are already there." He was--and as history has proven, the situation was well in hand.[6]

The points of the two stories are: the pattern of world political events presents a confused picture; because of seapower, the striking fleets (both Sixth and Seventh) have logistic support, mobility in immediate response, flexibility in choice of weapons systems (be it a Marine with a rifle or an aircraft with a nuclear weapon), and a point which has not been mentioned but is vital today, an immediate communication link with political control centers for guidance and instruction.

Thus, the principles upon which the Seventh Fleet constitute a useful military tool have not been altered--but the form and application of the Seventh Fleet's capability has undergone tremendous technological and tactical revision.

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[6]Mentioned in a discussion of seapower principles by Captain Harvey P. Lanham, USN, who was Admiral Burke's personal aide at the time of the Lebanon crisis.

CHAPTER IV

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS--
FRINGE BENEFITS

I. THREAT AND CONFIDENCE

Due to the changing nature of power, greater emphasis is steadily being placed on psychological pressures to achieve political ends. Navies have always been central actors in such power plays

> . . . because of the high mobility of navies, which are able to bring the flag and power of a nation to the four corners of the globe, and because of the great impressiveness of their appearance, naval demonstrations have in the past been a favorite instrument of the policy of prestige.[1]

> The U. S. Government has been moving steadily toward a heightened awareness of the importance of political warfare in relation to the armed forces. As far back as 1953, the President's Committee on International Information Activities said, "In reality, there is a psychological aspect or implication to every diplomatic, economic or military policy and action . . . .
>
> For the first time in its history, the United States must develop and maintain a capability for waging political warfare on a grand scale. It is not enough to have fleet units off the African coast. The people of every nation with a shoreline . . . must know about the U. S. Fleet. They must not be allowed to forget its presence. Therefore, such a fleet would have as its primary task,

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[1] Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations (third edition; New York: Knopf, 1960), p. 78.

CHAPTER XI

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS—

Please Remember

By . . . MONEY AND CREDIT . . .

They be the controlling powers of peace, greater emphasis
is steadily being placed on psychological resources by
military political men. Navies have always been counted
solely in much lower light

. . . Because of the high mobility of navies, ships
can fight to defend the flag and power of a nation to
the very corners of the globe. And because of the
great concentrations of fighting strength, navies
represent the acme of the policy of penetration.

Thus a Government can judge wavering stability
toward a politically unfriendly government by the behavior of
political warships in relation to the armed forces.
In the fall of 1931, the Brazilian Government
was very busy [illegible] activities and, "In
[illegible] Rio, it is a psychological element of importance
quite to every diplomatic, consular or military
policy and action . . . ."

For the first time in its history, the United
States must develop and maintain a capability that
requires most heavily and materially a specific people. It is
mainly political warfare on a global scale. It is
most unlikely to have clear cut wars without
ever knowing by whom they are fought. Therefore
[illegible] must be fought with a knowledge. The people of every nation
like . . . must know about the [illegible] that
must be allowed to enjoy its privileges. There,
then, goods & items would have no [illegible] that

Figure 2. Geographer, Isaiah Bowman Editor [illegible]
entitled Geo Pacific Ranges, [illegible] p. 18.

> not the sinking of enemy ships, but rather the influencing of opinions, attitudes, and political behavior of uncommitted peoples in such ways as to advance the high national aims of the United States.[2]

In addition to pure military posture, naval units in friendly visits to ports of call provide contacts in the "People to People" program initiated by President Eisenhower. The importance of this vital function is frequently overlooked because it is lost in the fanfare accorded dignitaries and the press coverage given to the international implications of such visits. Fortunately, key people in this program are well aware of the humble contacts made by the enlisted personnel.

> Because the American whom an Asian is most likely to meet these days is in uniform, Stump [Admiral Stump, then Commander-in-Chief Pacific] insists that all servicemen function in a dual capacity: they must be soldiers and sailors, and they must be shirt-sleeve diplomats . . . . To overcome this basic distrust [of all white people] the Admiral urges his men to avoid "tight white" colonies and to make friends with the people they have come to help.[3]

The message of the importance of this aspect of the United States Navy's mission has been fairly well covered by popular news media.[4] Life Magazine, December 23, 1957, in

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[2]Anthony Harrigan, "Sea Power: Bulwark Against Chinese Communist Imperialism," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings (June 1960), p. 28.

[3]Fred Sparks, "Admiral Stump Shows the Flag--And The Heart," Readers Digest (December 1955), p. 99.

[4]Franc Shor, "Good Will Ambassadors of the U. S. Navy Win Friends in the Far East," The National Geographic Magazine, September 1959, pp. 283-335.

not the plotting of enemy ships, but rather join in-
fluencing of opinions, activities, and political
behavior of nonmilitary peoples in such ways as to
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Because the American whose [illegible] is most likely
to meet these days is in uniform, Army [illegible]
Navy, Navy Commander-in-Chief Pacific) insists that
all servicemen function in a dual capacity. They
will be soldiers and sailors, and they must be diplo-
matic [illegible]. . . . The overseas GIs could [ille-
gible] let all white people] the Admiral urges his men
to avoid "high white" colonels and to [illegible]
[in the people they have come to help.][4]

The necessity of the importance of this aspect of the
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[3]Anthony Harrigan, "Sea Power: Strong Ally Against Chinese Communist Imperialism," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings (June 1960), p. 82.

[4]Read Morris, "Admiral Stump Shows the Flag--and The Heart," Saturday Evening Post (December 1957), p. 28.

[5]Read Eder, "Good Will Ambassadors of the U. S. Navy Via Friends in the Far East," The National Geographic Magazine, September 1959, pp. 383-413.

an article entitled, "Keeper of the Peace in the Pacific" refers to the Seventh Fleet as "doubling in diplomacy and deterrence." In the June 22, 1962, issue of Life an article on the "Mighty New Navy of the U. S. A.," quotes Admiral David L. McDonald, USN (then Commander, Sixth Fleet) that "we all have two jobs" in reference to our military and "ambassadorial functions."

One final quote regarding this area of conscious effort on the part of the Navy to build confidence in our allies that the United States will honor its commitments is made by Demaree Bess and refers to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The principles involved apply equally well to the Seventh Fleet in the Far East.

> But although our Navy has employed the most powerful unit in the Mediterranean since September, 1946, it is true that this task force has been used over here chiefly as an instrument of diplomacy. The American people are intimately involved today in the affairs of Greece, Turkey . . . [etc.], and our Navy is the visible symbol of our participation.[5]

In the area of threat as a psychological tool, no clearer case can be made than that of the offshore islands and Formosa. It is generally conceded that if it were not for the Seventh Fleet and the threat it poses for Peking, Formosa would long ago have fallen into the Communist orbit.

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[5]Demaree Bess, "Our Navy in Striped Pants," Saturday Evening Post (May 14, 1948), p. 30.

on matters material, "leaves of bye leaves in the pocket"
related to the Kennedy files as "according to diplomacy and
[illegible]ocom." In June 31, 1961, issue of Life on Politics
on the "highly key army of the U. S. x-," Joanne Alsop,
David D. Hoogstad, Com Times Commentator, Alsop "Jeer! them
"We all have two jobs" In reference to our military and
"Administrative Functions."

Some Times' Update Kennedy this week at conference
office that the date of the Navy to build Constitution in and
Hills that the United States will honor its commitments in
made by Democrats here and refers to the State Times in the
Kennedy Administration. The Maintained supply equally until
to the Kennedy Times in the Far East.

This Although our army has emptied its cash [illegible]
into [illegible] before has been used into Navy
Clearly as an Instrument of diplomacy. The American
people are Increasingly Involved today in the affairs of
nations. Twenty . . . [illegible], and our army is the
crucial school of our Participation."[3]

In the area of courses as a psychological tool, he
first Freedom. It is generally conceived that it were for
clearer cuts can be made than made in the reliance rained
for the Kennedy Times and the threat it poses for taking.
Foreign world loop ope Base fallen Lope the Communist with.

---

[3]Cameron Hunt, "Can Navy In Tripod Peace," Saturday Evening Post Chat 14, 1961), 24-30.

The second psychological aspect regarding Formosa is:

> Not only must we remain steadfast in our support of Free China, but we must also continue our successful policy of helping Free China to defend its offshore island territories. These islands have the same psychological importance for free Chinese everywhere that Berlin has for free Germans.[6]

There can be no doubt that the threat of retaliation by the Seventh Fleet, in conjunction with United States airpower has seriously hampered Communist China's aggressive intentions. Deterrence is in itself largely a psychological attitude. The Chinese Communist Party is quick to label American forces and strength as that of a "paper tiger," however, they consistently refuse to accept the risk of nuclear war being waged against them.[7]

In addition, there are other psychological advantages which are generally overlooked when discussing the Seventh Fleet operations. A few of these are:

> 1. The Navy's deterrent stand is non-provocative. Since current naval deployments on a global scale have been maintained for many years, their presence in close proximity to threatened areas is now accepted as routine. There is no need to fear the danger of worsening an already bad situation by

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[6]Anthony Bouscaran, "The Nature of War We Are In," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings (October 1961), p. 35.

[7]Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962). A comprehensive and well-documented work which describes in detail the evolution of Communist China's attitudes toward atomic warfare and the factors which influenced their thinking.

The Soviet psychological impact regarding Russian la[illegible]

But only would we remain skeptical in our support
of free China, but we must also question our dogma-
tic policy of helping free China to defend its off-
shore island bastions. These islands have the
[illegible] psychological importance for free Chinese other-
wise that Quemoy has for free Germans.[8]

There can be no doubt that the threat of retaliation
by the Peaceful Light, in combination with United States nu-
clear power has certainly deterred Communist China's aggressive
intentions. Peacefulness is in itself largely a psychological
attitude. The Chinese Communist Party is ready to risk
American forces and atomweapons as some of a "paper tiger,"
however, they considerably reduce by enough its value of de-
ciant we being waged against them?

In addition, there are other psychological strategic
moves are presently available where reasoning the necessity
first operations. A few of these are:

1. The Navy's interest level in non-Peaceful
light content nuclear explosion in a liquid media
have been maintained for many years, study programs
in close proximity to Hiroshima drive it and
accepted as routine. There is no need to keep the
degree of secrecy in already had situation by

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[8] Anthony Leviero, "The Defense of Why We Are In."
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings (October 1954), p. 1094

[illegible] Leary Kelly, Communist China's Military In
the Korean War (Stanford University Press, 1956).
Describes in depth the evolution of Communist China's
strategies towards atomic warfare and the factors which
influence their thinking.

> having to re-deploy. We are relieved of the hazard of precipitating an enemy attack by the hasty movement of forces from the United States to the scene of possible trouble.[8]
>
> 2. We can bolster the local will to resist by standing by, ready, in periods of tension, yet without imposing ourselves physically on a troubled populace.
>
> 3. Our prompt entry into any state bordering the sea cannot be prevented by the refusal of a nervous or unsympathetic third nation to grant us transit rights, or to permit our use of already established bases.[9]

4. Seapower reduces the need for overseas bases which most foreign people regard as constituting an invitation to attack on their country.

5. Naval forces at sea comprise pure military targets which relieve civilian tensions as they are out of the zone of danger generated by such forces.

The greatest limitation on the "show the flag" operations is that it usually is confined to coastal water areas. This has been overcome if the need is deemed urgent enough to have aircraft carriers launch mass "overflights" to bring the desired psychological results inland. A specific case in point was the complete coverage of Italy by naval aircraft at low level a matter of hours before the official occupation

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[8]Harvey B. Seim, Captain, USN, "Naval Power and Deterrence," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (December 1961), p. 68.

[9]Stewart B. Barber, "Seapower and American Survival," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (March 1961), p. 60.

ended. A parallel in the Far East was:

> The Fleet's peacetime mission had largely been that of showing the flag around the Orient; in fact the planes of Air Group Five had flown parade over Inchon and Seoul on 5 April [1950] from the decks of the Valley Forge. A few days later they appeared over Hong Kong.[10]

In summation, naval operations, to show strength for either intimidation of a potential enemy or to inspire confidence in allies, have unique advantages over other forms of military demonstrations. One of the best contemporary illustrations of this is the Seventh Fleet off Formosa. Mass psychological measurement is difficult, and the only valid criteria is results. Using this as the guideline, it is rather clear that in areas of "threat and confidence" the Seventh Fleet has achieved at least a modest degree of success.

II. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the cost to the United States of maintaining the Seventh Fleet in Far Eastern waters. One can rest assured that though the cost is tremendous, it is still an economically sound instrument of policy. The political conflict in Congress over

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[10] Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in China (Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1957), p. 32.

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II. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

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[10]Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1957), p. 14.

appropriations and the inter-service rivalry in the Pentagon have created exhaustive studies on all military operations, and the fact that the Seventh Fleet maintains its mission is *prima facie* evidence that it is economically feasible as a political-military tool in the Far East.

The economic facts to be considered fall into two categories. First is the contribution the Seventh Fleet makes to foreign economies. In general, this contribution is made in five areas, two of which are generally fixed, and three which constitute variables. The two fixed items represent major United States naval bases, primarily in Japan and the Philippines; and naval shipyards which do extensive repairs for the United States---generally found in Japan. These two fixed sources of "hard currency" producing endeavors that give local support to the Seventh Fleet can be considered as major economic props to their national economies. These, in turn, bolster the overall gross national product. A typical example is the main United States naval base at Yokosuka, Japan. By September 1959, the United States had "spent about $15,000,000 on repairs and improvements."[11] These bases and shipyards not only helped the local economies but saved American taxpayers money. Not counting transit costs and time to return to the

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[11]Shor, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

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[11] Moore, op. cit., p. 311.

west coast of the United States, direct savings on shipyard work done in Japan ran from 65 per cent to 80 per cent.[12] Domestic American politics, in the form of west coast Congressmen, representing shipyards, have curtailed to a degree the savings to American taxpayers by restricting the amount and nature of work which can be performed at advance bases.

The variables are derived from port of call visits and landing fees. It does not take much imagination to realize the economic impact on a local community when four thousand young men who have been out to sea for two weeks suddenly arrive. As a general rule (using Hong Kong as an example) the Naval International Balance of Payments Section bases its per capita expenditure of United States dollars as: the number of men granted liberty during an average in-port period times $20.00.[13]

This is coupled with the fact that the average Seventh Fleet sailor receives more pay in one month than the average native of the area earns in one year. Japan, of course, falls into a different category in this respect, but it is still good business. The average month's pay to officers

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[12] Ibid.

[13] Mr. Irvin Cohen, Navy Comptroller Office, International Balance of Payments Section, Washington, D. C. From a conversation on April 17, 1964.

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[12] Ibid.

[13] Joe. Irvin Cohen, Navy Cooperative Affairs, Interoceanic Railroad of Panamá Section, Washington, D. C. Personal interview on April 27, 1924.

and crew aboard one Forrestal-class attack carrier amounts to $614,000.00.[14] Another important feature is that of being able to select ports of call and in this way the economic contribution to an indigenous economy can be given political discrimination under a given situation. This may not represent a large contribution to those infrequent ports of call, but those areas which are visited regularly, such as Hong Kong, enjoy direct economic support by the United States in this manner.

The second category to be reviewed is the current gold flow crisis. The Seventh Fleet offers unique advantages in this respect as for all practical purposes and political considerations there is complete control of "hard currency" exchange. Unlike the U. S. Air Force and the U. S. Army, which require bases on foreign territories in the Far East, the Navy can: evacuate the bases and shipyards overseas and stay at sea without making ports of call and paying landing fees. This would be inconvenient, costly, hard on morale, and deny the Navy its good will functions--but it could be done. For example, 98 per cent of all supply for the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits is supplied by sea only.[15] As long as the United States maintains control of

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[14]Lieutenant George Meade, USN (SC), Pentagon, Nav-Compt Code NCAS 214, 18 August 1963.

[15]Shor, op. cit., p. 311.

and crew aboard one Patterson-class attack destroyer assigned to SEATO[12]. Americans temporarily stationed in Thailand during SEATO be natural prefix if Thai and in this way the communist contributions be so inadequately that the given qualified client-interaction update a given situation. This may mark movements a large contributions to these interpreter pairs of small, but those areas which are visited regularly, such as Hong Kong, enjoy direct economic support of the United States in this manner.

The second category to be furthered in the research will [illegible]. The French fleet sitting multi-purpose helps to this investment as the all operational purposes and political considerations always to complete control of "naval diplomacy" exchange. During the U. S. Air Force and the U. S. Army, which contains bases as Kodiak participation in the Far East, the Navy could [illegible] the Texas and Philippines area not shown it has without seeking points of still new keeping lapsing fees. This would be interpretively exactly, would be negative, and newly the Navy its quasi multi-purposes--that it could be done. For example, US per cents of all supply the Chinese fleets in the Taiwan Straits is supplied by sea only.[13] In Iraq as the United States maintains control of

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[12]Alexander George Plaats, USN (ret.), Washington, Navy-Comet Code NCAS 214, 28 August 1963.

[13]Ibid., pp. 112.

the sea, full logistic support of the Seventh Fleet can be maintained directly from Hawaii with at-sea replenishment.

To conclude the discussion of economic factors: the Seventh Fleet as a political-military tool can be varied in missions from a discriminating contributor to foreign economies or, as one would turn off a valve, to complete isolation, thus contributing to the solution of the gold flow problem. In either case, it can perform its military function, but in the latter example the capacity to encourage friendly relations with foreign allies and "show the flag" to bolster confidence would be impaired.

CHAPTER V

THE SEVENTH FLEET: IS IT THE CORRECT POLITICAL MILITARY FORCE FOR THE ASIAN QUESTION?

I. THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES IN THE USE OF NAVAL SEAPOWER

The political decision maker of today is faced with a myriad of factors and overspill effects from any decision made in the field of international relations. It is very improbable that any action will meet the satisfaction of all concerned. The problem resolves itself to one of maximizing what advantages accrue from a given situation and minimizing the inherent disadvantages involved.

The discussion of the advantages in the use of naval power is largely an expansion of the previously-mentioned factors of capability as viewed by a political decision maker. These advantages are:

1. Mobility. Immediate response and ability to shift concentrated power over 70 per cent of the earth's surface.[1] In the case of the Seventh Fleet, the full range of eastern Asia and Indonesia can be covered. If desired,

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[1]The relationship of the three-mile limit of territorial seas to the U. S. Navy's mobility capability is discussed by U. S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral A. Burke, USN in the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 42.1, p. 259.

of eastern Asia and Indonesia can be conceived. If denied,

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mobility enhances surprise. In concrete terms, the distance from Southern Korea to Malaya is about 2,400 nautical miles. Assuming the fleet could get underway immediately, weather conditions were favorable to a high speed of advance and a direct route is available, the optimum time for transit is about five days.[2] This "elapse" time is not realistic, however, if the Seventh Fleet is required to maintain an airborne combat patrol of fighters on a twenty-four hour basis. If this condition exists, the carriers must, of necessity, turn into the wind to launch and recover aircraft. If the wind is from the direction of intended fleet movement, no time is lost; if the wind is one hundred eighty degrees from intended direction of travel, the transit time would be increased by at least 25 per cent, assuming the fighters would be launched and recovered every two hours.[3] There are many other variables; such as, natural wind velocity, number of aircraft launched, degree of cover provided by the U. S. Air Force when within their land based fighter range, etc. As a good thumb rule, five hundred nautical miles per twenty-four hour period is valid and three hundred nautical miles per

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[2]Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in China (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957), pp. 32-36. U. S. Seventh Fleet units deployed from Buckner Bay, Okinawa, on July 1, 1950, and launched a pre-dawn strike July 3, 1950, on targets deep in Korea.

[3]This is assuming optimum normal conditions with F4 Phantom II aircraft and minimum use of afterburner for endurance reasons.

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[3] Malcolm H. Cooke and Frank A. Mankin, The Day Ban in Cuba (Washington: U.S. Naval Institute, 1937), pp. 12-20.
On September 1st 1320, and launched a pre-dawn strike July 3, 1320, on July 1st 1320, and launched a pre-dawn strike July 3, 1320, on September 1st 1320, and launched a pre-dawn strike July 3, 1320, on September 1st 1320, and launched a pre-dawn strike July 3, 1320, on

day is conservative for the fleet's speed of advance under the conditions which have been assumed in the example.

In addition, mobility provides a moving target to ICBM type weapons. To date, technology has not solved the problem posed by this factor. To counter this argument, opponents claim the fleet movement schedule is common knowledge and an ICBM pre-emptive strike against naval units could be made while these units were in port or undergoing repairs. To preclude another "Pearl Harbor" in this manner, major fleet units (especially aircraft carriers) are never to be found in port all at the same time. This principle applies equally to those stationed in the United States proper as well as those deployed with the striking fleets on station.

2. Flexibility. If the decision is for armed conflict, the complete range of weapons from "H" bomb to small conventional weapons is available for any gradation of desired force to be applied.

3. Control of the sea. This insures logistic support of any venture attempted, and by the same token denies logistic support to the enemy by sea. The Berlin airlift clearly demonstrated any major continuous logistic support by air is prohibitive in cost. The sea is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the most practical and inexpensive means of transportation for bulk cargo and personnel. A bonus factor is the ability to blockade--an effective

economic weapon. The recent Cuban crisis is eloquent testimony to the use of naval blockade; however, there may be legal disadvantages as a result. The naval blockade of China has been discussed as a possible form of economic coercion.[4]

4. Command and control of naval forces. Through modern communications, complete control can be exercised from Washington, D. C. This is to prevent a local military command from inadvertently causing escalation of a conflict.

5. Fleets can be employed in international waters. The decision maker is not faced with violation of the territorial sovereignty of a third power, nor is the third power embarrassed by a request for use of its transient facilities. By presenting a target on the high seas, civilians are not involved nor is a friendly power inviting attack because our offensive military strength is based in that country. In contrast to the limited dependence of the Navy on foreign bases (supra, p. 75), the U. S. Air Force and U. S. Army are heavily dependent on such bases. On the positive side of the ledger, these bases reduce reaction time, increase combat radius, compel a potential enemy to disperse his defenses,

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[4]See Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 28, March 16, 1953, p. 414, for comments by General Omar Bradley in his capacity as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff; or Vol. 31, September 1954, p. 888, for comments by Secretary of State John F. Dulles.

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[4]See *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 39, March 14, 1932, p. 414, for comments by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson; September 1934, p. 185, for comments by Secretary of War Newton D. Baker; and *Time*, Vol. 79, March 14, 1932, p. 16, for comments by General Douglas MacArthur in his capacity as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, as Time, 11,

and bring to bear medium-range U. S. Air Force weapons systems which could not otherwise be effective. On the negative side, foreign bases create local friction, become fixed targets for the enemy (thus endangering the local populace), augment the adverse national flow of gold, and tend to be regarded as neocolonialism.[5]

Time Magazine[6] gave a favorable impression of our overseas bases; however, considering ICBM capability, the intense nationalism and the ill will these bases sometimes create, it appears that Neal Stafford is more nearly correct when he states:

> . . . scientific technology and advances in weaponeering may have outdated foreign bases as far as the United States is concerned, but they do not outmode allies.[7]

Of all the incidents which jeopardized the American overseas air base program, the most famous was the Powers U-2 affair which took place on May 1, 1960. The Soviet version[8] and the Francis Powers' trial were given wide publicity and created a great deal of propaganda value for left-wing

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[5]Townsend Hoopes, "Overseas Bases in American Strategy," Foreign Affairs (October 1958), p. 92.

[6]"Overseas Bases: Durable Assets," Time, July 4, 1960.

[7]Neal Stafford, "Our Changing Military Policy," Foreign Policy Bulletin (Vol. 39, No. 20), July 1, 1960, p. 155.

[8]"The Trial of the U-2," (Chicago: Translation World Publishers, 1960), pp. 1-158.

elements in those nations from which U-2 flights could originate. The incident caused very unfavorable reaction in Japan to the Kishi government's renewal of the Japanese-American treaty which provided bases in Japan to United States forces.[9] This treaty included naval bases as well as U. S. Air Force and U. S. Army installations.

In addition, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines recently issued a joint statement in which they agreed that temporary foreign bases should not be allowed to be used by "Big Powers" to subvert the national independence of the three countries. A recent newspaper article states:

> None of SEATO's members has shown any enthusiasm for the organization of late and many, in candid moments, admit it is just what the Communist Chinese accuse it of being, "a paper tiger."
>
> But the bases are something else again, particularly if Indonesia chooses to emphasize the idea that the three countries will abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the powers.
>
> U. S. and British officials certainly are not pressing for any clarification at this point.[10]

6. Ground support is available. Lebanon is the classic example where the decision maker, through deployed Marine Corps units attached to the fleet, could, if desired,

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[9]Norman A. Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, 1945-1960 (Princeton: Nostrand, Inc., 1962), pp. 104-5.

[10]Warren Unna, "Air Bases At Issue," The Washington Post, August 12, 1963, p. A-6.

[illegible] in these nations from which B-29 flights could originate. The incident caused very unfavorable reaction in Japan as the final government's removal of the Japanese-American treaty which provided bases in Japan for United States forces.[9] This treaty included naval bases as well as U. S. Air Force and U. S. Army installations.

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[9] Warren A. Grayson, Child for Diplomacy, 1941-1950 (Princeton: Woolward, Inc., 1951), pp. 105-3.

[10] "Peace Dims, "Air Bases As Items," The Washington Post, August 13, 1953, p. A-6.

operate ashore. Thus, with air drop or conventional logistic support come to the aid of a friendly foreign power or establish a beachhead.

7. Psychological weapon. Naval units provide ideal weapons for propaganda and psychological warfare. By subtle combination and employment, the fleet can provide the complete spectrum of military posture from threat to an enemy to inspiring confidence in our allies.

8. Economic tools. In a limited manner, through political decision, the fleet can provide an economic lever to help achieve political ends. This is amplified in Chapter IV of this paper.

9. Choice of alternatives. This consideration (except for the fleet's actual military capability) presents the decision maker with the critical tool he needs. Above all in today's complex and entangled political developments, it is mandatory that the politician have a wide range of alternatives with which he can project the influence of the United States qualitatively and quantitatively. The Seventh Fleet provides such an instrument under specific circumstances and situations where overt military power is required within reasonable range of the Seventh Fleet's radius of action.

II. THE DISADVANTAGES FACING THE SEVENTH FLEET

The Seventh Fleet is quite impotent to counter guerrillas and the slow subversion of weak governments on the mainland of Asia--primarily a political problem. As the nature of the struggle in these areas is political, and the military tactics represent an unorthodox combat approach, vis-à-vis the American military posture, the Seventh Fleet cannot cope with the existing problems by a totally military solution. Small units using agitprop and terror cannot be countered by the Seventh Fleet as a practical military problem. However, to effect finally the control of a country, armies of conventional size and strength must be employed, using to a degree conventional tactics. Unfortunately, current history can produce the corpses of governments which fell (almost invariably) once the guerrilla movement became strong enough to produce army-size units. Two specific cases are: French-Indo China and the prime example for the world, Communist China.

You cannot use weapons to kill ideas, nor can you destroy targets that are not to be seen. The core of the current problem is stated succinctly: the great danger is that Communist China will give military support to indigenous insurrectionary groups and the Peking relationship to these insurrectionary forces will be so ambiguous and disguised,

that threats of retaliation against China may be ineffective as a deterrent.[11] The problem, therefore, can be simply proposed as one of internal security against Communist-inspired revolutionists guided and given the military capacity by Peking.

The revolutionists have made a wise choice of weapons--unconventional warfare and protracted conflict techniques.[12]

> The objective of conventional combat is to win a state by defeating the enemy's military forces in the field. In contrast, the strategy of unconventional forces must be to win control of the state by first winning control of the civil population.[13]

The obvious answer to this strategy is to fight fire with fire. The British in Malaya have achieved some degree of success with this approach,[14] but it is readily apparent that the Seventh Fleet is not, and probably will not, be modified in mission or capability to assume major responsibilities in this mode of conflict. Central to the United States approach to solution of insurgency problems in

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[11] A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 143.

[12] Robert Strauz-Hupe, et al., Protracted Conflict (New York: Harper and Bros., 1959). The concepts discussed in this publication are central to the understanding of the overall contemporary conflict being waged in the Far East.

[13] Franklin A. Lindsay, "Unconventional Warfare," Foreign Affairs (January 1962), p. 264.

[14] Franklin M. Osanka (ed.), Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 293-320.

that viewers of totalitarian epidemic films may be inclined to be a deterrent."[13] The problem, however, can be simply explained by one of Schorske's security against Communist-inspired revolutionists united and given the military capacity by Yeaton.

The revolutionists here pose a clear choice of weapon--economy-national military and political conflict techniques."[12]

The optimists of conventional combat is by rule a state by defending the enemy's military forces in the field. In contrast, the strategy of nonconventional tactics must be to win control by some steps by first winning control of the civil population."[13]

The obvious answer to this strategy is to fight this war. The British in Malaya have achieved some degree of success with this technique,[14] but it is doubtful whether the American Plans is not, and probably will not, be modified in relation of capability to pursue major political to this mode of conflict. Counter to the Indian

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[13]H. Dean Swenson, Communism Today and Tomorrow (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 147.

[14]Robert Thomas Clough et al., Problems Short of War (New York: Harper and Row, 1962). The conclusion discussed in this publication are omitted by the considerations of the overall contemporary conflicts being waged in the Far East.

[15]Franklin A. Lindsay, "Unconventional Warfare," Foreign Affairs (January 1962), p. 264.

[16]Franklin M. Osanka (ed.), Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 121-122.

Southeast Asia is the strategic hamlet program.[15] This obviously, by its very nature, is primarily a U. S. Army mission and Seventh Fleet participation will be minimal.[16]

Thus, the changing nature of power has not invalidated the Seventh Fleet as a political-military tool, but it has established distinct limits to the form, application and timing of its capability.

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[15]Roger Hilsman, "The Answer to Exported Aggression," The General Electric Forum, April-June 1963, p. 21.

[16]One of the better collection of articles on the problem of insurgency is "Readings in Counterinsurgency, 1963," U. S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, compiled by the Academy's Department of Social Sciences.

CHAPTER VI

MAJOR FAR EASTERN POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE

This chapter represents an attempt to discuss major Far Eastern political problems of the future without reference to the Seventh Fleet. Chapter VII, Conclusions, then, will be a synthesis of Chapters I-V and this chapter. Because future Far Eastern political issues represent a logical extension of past and present problems, there will be minor repetitions of material found in previous chapters to establish the required conceptual framework with which to develop conclusions.

I. COMMUNISM

The four main goals of Communism as outlined by Neal Stafford are:

1. A more active and militant policy for the underdeveloped world--eradication of all western influence: political, economic, and military.

2. Intensification of the class struggle and support of "national democracies."

3. Strengthening of military defenses.

CHAPTER XI

MAJOR PAN EASTERN POLITICAL PROBLEMS

OF THE FUTURE

This chapter represents no attempt to discuss major Far Eastern political problems of the future without reference to the Seventh Fleet. Chapter VII, Conclusions, then, will be a synthesis of Chapters I-V and this chapter. Because future duties for Western political leaders requiring a logical extension of past and present problems, there will be minor repetitions of material found in preceding chapters to substitute the required nonchronological treatment with which to develop conclusions.

1. COMMUNISM

The three main goals of Communism as outlined by Neal Stanford are:

1. A more active and militant policy for the communist-developed world--eradication of all western influence: political, economic, and military.

2. Intensification of the class struggle and exploitation of "national democracies."

3. Accomplishment of military defeats.

4. The United States is the major enemy and anti-American propaganda must be increased.[1]

Due to the recent trends in polycenterism found within the Communist camp, with the wide schism between Moscow and Peking being the paramount example, a clarification of the term Communism is mandatory. As discussed in this chapter, consider the variant to be the Leninist-Stalinist-Maoist version. The ideology, means to achieve desired ends, patterns of economic and social problems, and the historical base of colonialism in the area all tend to favor the Peking concept of Communism over that of the Moscow version. The latter form daily grows more conservative in nature as the standards of living in the Soviet Union more nearly approximate those of the United States and Western Europe.

A review of Chinese Communist "great leap" and subsequent events clearly develops the Chinese pattern and bid for the Communist leadership of the underdeveloped world.

> The high rate of increase in China's industrial and agricultural production is of great political significance . . . . Externally, the fast rate at which industrial and agricultural production is developing in China will greatly strengthen the whole socialist camp, while the peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America, who have just freed, or are freeing themselves, from colonial rule, will

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[1]Neal Stafford, "Communism's Four Main Goals," Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. 40, No. 9, January 15, 1961, p. 67.

4. The United States is the major enemy and anti-American propaganda must be increased.[1]

Due to the recent trends in polycentrism found within the Communist camp, with the wide action between Moscow and Peking being the foremost example, a clarification of the Sino-Communist is mandatory. As discussed in this chapter, consider the reasons to be the Leninist-Stalinist-Maoist variable. The ideology, means to achieve desired ends, patterns of economic and social progress, and the diagnostical base of nationalities in the area all tend to favor the Peking concept of Communism over that of the Moscow variation. The latter more daily grows more conservative in making an immediate withdrawal in the United States more nearly approximate those of the United States and Western Europe.

A review of Chinese Communist "great leap" and accompanying events clearly develops the Chinese pattern and bid for the Communist leadership of the underdeveloped world.

> The high rate of increase in China's industrial and agricultural production is of great political significance . . . Eventually, the time ratio at which industrial and agricultural production is developing in China will greatly strengthen the whole Socialist camp, while the peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America, who have just freed, or are freeing themselves, from colonial rule, will

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[1] Neal Stanford, "Communism's Four Main Goals," Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. 40, No. 9, January 15, 1961, p. 67.

> draw confidence and strength in their struggle for a better life from China's experience in her big leap.[2]

The "great leap" and its overspill effects had wide and lasting consequences in Sino-Soviet affairs. The clash of interests was in two primary areas: ideological and matters of practical consideration.

The "great leap" had as a practical consideration a tremendous reliance on Soviet technical aid and material. As the rift between the Communist giants widened, Soviet aid was slowly withdrawn; however, some relief was given Peking in regard to payment of loans. The figures given in the Far Eastern Economic Review 1962 Yearbook reflects this as follows:

> Despite political differences of opinion and their inevitable inroads on economic cooperation, the Russians conceded a period of grace for the repayment of $320 million trade deficit which China incurred with the U.S.S.R. during 1960. In effect, the Chinese were able to ignore this figure during 1961, but they were expected to make a token start of repayment during 1962, and to repay the greater part of the debt during 1963-1965. Chinese exports to Russia fell in 1960 to about half their 1959 level while imports from the U.S.S.R. in 1960 were only about $100 million less than the $950 million recorded in 1959.[3]

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[2]Hsueh Mu-Chiao, The Socialist Transformation of the National Economy in China (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1960), p. 269.

[3]Far Eastern Economic Review 1962 Yearbook, p. 29.

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[2] Hsiao Mo-Chang, The Socialist Transformation of the National Economy in China (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1960), p. 163.

[3] The Eastern Economic Review 1962 Yearbook, p. 29.

As Sino-Soviet tensions increased, economic teamwork deteriorated proportionately.

Of a much graver nature was the ideological conflict which many writers link to Moscow's contemporary posture vis-à-vis Peking. To underestimate the effect of Chinese Communist pressure on the Soviets is to make a serious error as to how deep the power struggle is between the U.S.S.R. and Peking. One of the first open ideological conflicts took place over the commune system. On July 18, 1959, Khrushchev made a speech in Poland in which he stated:

> . . . that the Chinese in setting up communes had a "poor understanding" of how to build Communism. Referring to the early Soviet experience with communes, he said they were a dismal failure because neither the material nor political prerequisites for them existed. Those "people" who wanted to set them up in the U.S.S.R., he said, "had a poor understanding of what Communism is and how it is to be built" . . . . Khrushchev's indirect but unmistakable attack on the Chinese communes was clearly premeditated and carefully executed.[4]

The differences of opinion over the Chinese instituting communes led to other major schisms. The Chinese bid for revolutionary leadership as the true defenders of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism remains with us today. It was clearly evidenced in Peking's denunciation of Moscow on

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[4]Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1957-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 134.

as rune-comic features increased, economic improvements decreased proportionately.

Of a much graver nature was the ideological conflict which many writers link to Moscow's doctrinarily partyline-ite feeling. To understimate the effect of Chinese Communist pressure on the Soviets is to make a serious error as to how deep the power struggle in between the U.S.S.R. and Russia, one of the first open ideological conflicts took place over the cenmune system. On July 16, 1959, Khrushchev made a speech in Poland in which he stated:

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The difference in opinion over the Chinese leadership continue led to other major actions. The Chinese bid for leadership immediately as the true defenders of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism reacting with no delay. It was clearly evidenced in Peking's denunciation of Moscow on

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[2] Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1957-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 124.

January 1, 1963.[5] The radical innovations attempted by the "great leap" and its early partial successes may have convinced Mao that, as a theorist, his Chinese model was superior to the Soviet model for practical application by the underdeveloped nations.

> Perhaps at the root of Chinese dissatisfaction with Soviet strategy in the underdeveloped areas was the desire of the Chinese to replace the Russians as the leaders of the revolutionary movement there. Such aspirations were best revealed by the bold revival in 1959 and 1960 of Chinese claims that Maoist theory and Chinese revolutionary experience were valid for underdeveloped areas, and, by implication, that Soviet theory and revolutionary experience were not.[6]

The Soviet reply came largely in the form of the 1960 Moscow Declaration wherein Lenin's cooperative plan, not the communes, was held to be valid in both underdeveloped and advanced countries. A second point made was that a "material base" was said to have been necessary for the transition to Communism. An obvious reference to the industrial backwardness of China. The declaration also made note that higher productivity must be achieved through technical progress (here the Chinese stressed manpower), economic planning (the "great leap" was most assuredly remiss in adequate planning), and strict observance of material incentives (the commune system for the most part categorically denied this

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[5] The Washington Post, January 1, 1963.

[6] Zagoria, op. cit., p. 266.

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[5]The Washington Post, January 1, 1963.

[6]Zagoria, op. cit., p. 166.

aspect as being "capitalistic"). A small concession was given to Chinese views by acknowledgment that higher productivity could be achieved by "heightening the political consciousness of the people."

A further issue which the Soviets played up during the period was the anti-Stalinists "cult of personality" line. This, of course, could be, and is frequently, interpreted as a direct reflection on Mao.

These, then, were some of the central considerations and issues between the Soviets and Communist Chinese during the "great leap" period. Obviously, they are not solved today; and, in fact, since the Cuban crisis, they have become graver and graver problems for the Communist bloc. Problems have become so serious that the Chinese have established their own "iron curtain" against Soviet Russia in the form of a fortified belt twenty miles deep and hundreds of miles long.[7]

The pending area of conflict in the international milieu is between the so-called "backward countries" or "underdeveloped areas" with their "rising expectations" which are not being met, and the high standard of living, "status quo" areas: in short the "north-south" cold war. It transcends in importance the east-west cold war which is

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[7]The Washington Post, April 16, 1964, p. 1.

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largely in stalemate status and cannot be resolved due to "Pax Atomica." With post-World War II recovery, the Soviet Union has become more of a "status quo" power than a revisionist power, and thus the east-west conflict is a dying issue. The U.S.S.R.-U. S. military and psychological postures vis-à-vis each will continue. The constant sparring and occasional military incident will continue to occur; each ideological system is the avowed enemy of the other to death--but neither intends the death to be premature through a nuclear exchange. Thus, through evolution, western capitalism becomes socialistic and Soviet communism moves towards capitalism. This is unacceptable to Communist China.

As the greatest revolutionary state in the world today, Communist China represents dynamic action in the attempt to solve the grave economic problems of the underdeveloped nations. The need is so great among the "have not" nations, that by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development figures, aid in the form of government grants and loans of all kinds by the west, when added today, may reach between $7.8 and $8.7 billion per year. Yet, according to United Nations estimates, if over a billion developing people are to increase their growth rate from 2 or 3 per cent to 5 or 6 per cent and keep ahead of the

population explosion, the aid figure must increase to $10 or $12 billion annually.[8]

As an external influence, the appeal of the intent and purpose of the "great leap" has a tremendous "psychological punch" to the underdeveloped nations. Although the "leap" was a dismal failure--in terms of the material goals established--the concept itself and the message regarding its method (i.e., the Chinese brand of Communism) cannot be overlooked or disregarded. For the pending conflict between the "have" and "have not" nations, the "have nots" are searching for an effective tool to further their cause. Mao's answer, in the form of peasants revolution and Chinese Communist support, finds massive understanding and sympathy throughout the underdeveloped world. In short, the pro-Communist nations and elements of the impoverished areas of the world are split in their loyalties between the Moscow and Peking centers of Communist thought.

In conclusion, the masses of Asia are being denied their demands which are crystallized and termed "rising expectations." The population explosion alone is grave enough to offset normal gains in standards of living, but this factor is compounded by crushing poverty and general

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illiteracy. The native peoples of the world are just beginning to feel the extent of their relative backwardness and modern communication media increase their hypersensitivity in this regard. To retain power, native leaders must promise near miraculous results; and they are failing in their goals. As the native looks around him, he is given Communist China, not Japan or the Soviet Union, as the great leader to solve the problems of Asia. This is the crux of the problem as there is sympathy and understanding through common economic and social goals which transcend for the moment the knowledge of the political policies and pressures used to achieve results under the Chinese Communist system. Until Communism can be proven a false solution to meet the challenge of the underdeveloped world,[9] it must be anticipated that Communism as a method to achieve social and economic change will appeal to, and be accepted by, most of the masses of the low income per capita peoples of the world; and that democracy in the western sense of the term is completely misunderstood and alien to them. The emergence of new independent states is often accompanied by violence,

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[9]See "The Developing Nations," The General Electric Forum, October-December 1963; and "Economic, Social and Political Change in the Underdeveloped Countries and Its Implications for U. S. Policy," Study No. 12, U. S. Foreign Policy, prepared for Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 30, 1960.

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uncertainty as to course of action, and smoldering resentments against their former colonial masters. All of this is accompanied by the ever-present poverty and backwardness of their people. It is the perfect environment for the seeds of Communism to mature. The only factor which offsets this bleak picture is that generally a nation is born with a high fever of nationalism which will resist imperialistic Communism--*if* the danger is recognized.

II. NATIONALISM

> . . . nationalism means the rebuilding of our nations; it means the effort to provide equal esteem for our peoples; it means the determination to take our future in our own hands . . . . Nationalism may be an out-of-date doctrine for many in this world; for us of Asia and Africa it is the mainspring of our efforts (repeated). To understand Asia and Africa, we must understand nationalism.
>
> President Sukarno of Indonesia[10]

The forces of nationalism and its influence on the international scene should not be underestimated. To the industrialized west, in a sense, nationalism represents the search for freedom under law as the organizing principle of human society.[11] To the newly emerging and largely former

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[10]From an address by President Sukarno to a joint meeting of the Senate and House of Representatives, May 17, 1956, *Congressional Record*, May 17, 1956, p. 7524.

[11]Barbara Ward, *Five Ideas That Changed the World* (New York: Norton and Co., 1959), p. 33.

12. NATIONALISM

. . . nationalism means the mobilizing of one nations; it means the effort to provide equal status for one people; it means the determination to take our future in our own hands . . . Nationalism may be an awkward stepping stone for many in this world; for us of Asia and Africa it is the stirring of our spirits into speedy action. To combat backward Asia and Africa, we must understand nationalism.

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The forces of nationalism and its influence on the international scene should not be underestimated. To the industrialized west, in a sense, nationalism represents the search for freedom under law as the organizing principle of human society.[11] To the newly emerging and largely diverse

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[11] Carlton Hayes, Fifty Years That Changed the World (New York: Harper and Co., 1939), p. xii.

colonial areas of the great powers, nationalism is a tool to be used to fight imperialists and create cohesive forces in their own country. For these new nations, political independence and national identity in world affairs are issues which rate top value priorities. The fanatic zeal with which the intense nationalism is pursued forecasts grave problems in a world, which for the older more stable nations, is a world moving towards the breakdown of tight impermeable territorial entities which jealously guard their sovereign rights to the exclusion of all others.

Unfortunately, nationalism is a psychological attitude and, therefore, will be difficult to moderate. The greatest hope to combat excessive emotional nationalism is the factor of time (which perhaps events will not allow) and a gradual awareness of world interdependence in areas of trade and commerce. In addition, the reliance by the emerging nations on the more advanced countries for aid and technical skills cannot be disregarded by them. Not the least of the influences will be participation in the United Nations and a growing recognition that independence has with it the "baggage of responsibility" to world order which cannot be denied.

Communism frequently regards virulent nationalism as

an ideal locale for expansion;[12] however, "traditional nationalism sought to free the nation from alien domination and give it a state of its own,"[13] and thus national interest continually thwarts hegomonic Communism and polycenterism appears or Communism is rejected completely. In general, today in Asia, many who are successful revolutionaries espousing the Communist cause, are primarily nationalists who demand social and economic change and are truly patriotic to their country--not to Red China or to the Soviet Union. It is a dangerous game and in the Far East has built-in traps which favor Chinese Communist infiltration.

Graebner is rather explicit on this point; he says:

> Communism in Asia, as in Europe, remained subservient to nationalism . . . . Even in the Communist countries of Asia, nationalism remained the chief determinant, and no quantity of Soviet arms would undermine its primacy unless they were accompanied by significant numbers of Russian troops.[14]

To the west, intense nationalism imposes a distinct barrier to free world efforts to aid Asia. As was previously noted, the vast areas of Asia were largely under western

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[12]"Blueprint of Revolution," Moscow University Herald, December 9, 1951, quoted in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 27, pp. 97-103. Initial steps of revolution are: (1) incite nationalism, (2) promote national front, (3) Communists take over leadership of the national front . . . etc.

[13]Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations (third edition; New York: Knopf, 1960), p. 336.

[14]Norman A. Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, 1945-1960 (Princeton: Nostrand, Inc., 1962), p. 121.

[illegible]

colonial rule or western sphere of influence. Thus, a form of nationalist conflict with the west is generated

> . . . by colonial revolutions and their aftermath. No subject people can become free of alien control without first developing a keen sense of nationalistic particularism and making the achievement of independence a primary objective. When independence is achieved, the hatreds that evolved through the struggle for self-determination continue and form a significant part of the policy of the new state toward their former colonial masters.[15]

III. ANTI-WHITE COLONIALISM

One of the most lasting effects of the heritage of the colonial past is a strong anti-colonial feeling on the part of most Asians which is coupled with a strong sensitivity to race prejudice. The "loss of face" through the humiliation of colonial rule or imposed extraterritoriality is difficult for the average westerner to comprehend. The American thinks of the Philippine venture in 1898 as a humanitarian gesture and regards pre-World War II relations with China as the United States being the defender of Chinese territorial integrity through the "open door" policy--little understanding that the Asian of today believes that the United States participated in the humiliation of China and Asia through "passive" or "economic

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[15]Charles O. Lerche and Abdul A. Said, Concepts of International Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 149.

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III. ANTI-WESTERN COLONIALISM

One of the most lasting effects of the heritage of the colonial past is a strong anti-colonial feeling on the part of almost nations which is coupled with a strong nationality to race prejudices. The "loss of face" through the humiliation of colonial rule or imposed interdependency is doubtful for the average westerner to comprehend. The American picture of the "dirty-dozen western" is used as a characterization gesture and reports pre-world war II relations with China as the United States being the defender of Chinese territorial integrity through the "open door" policy--itself untrustworthy into the realm of today because the United States participated in the humiliation of China and both through "treaty" or "agreement"

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[1] Charles O. Lerche and Abdul A. Said, Concepts of International Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 249.

imperialism" with equal guilt as the great empire builders of the nineteenth century.

The legacy of the colonial past and the problems it imposes range from: western administrative methods, economic development directed toward the needs of the colonial power rather than an Asian market, educational systems which intensified class differences, and not the least of the problems is the creation of artificial frontiers of colonial domination which met the convenience of European power politics with little regard of the native populations that they were imposed upon. The reaction of Asia can be seen in the "spirit of Bandung" and recent appeals for "Asian solidarity."

Anti-white colonialism represents a major emotional and psychological appeal upon which the peoples of Asia and Africa can unify--and Peking is well aware of it. As the West attempts to project its political influence through military, economic or propaganda means, there is an immediate distrust of intentions by the people of Asia.

The exception to anti-white colonialism, in general, is the Soviet Union. By arguing, the satellites of Eastern Europe are, in fact, hostages of Soviet imperialism, in the same sense that Asia was humiliated by the West, does not ring true or can convince an Asiam--simply because the situation is confined to the white races.

One of the most striking remarks regarding the successes of Communism and democracy is made by Hans Morganthau and focus on the role of anti-colonialism. He states:

> Communism has been successful wherever its tenets of social, economic, and political equality appeal to people for whom the removal of inequality has been the most urgent aspiration. Western philosophy has succeeded wherever in popular aspirations political liberty has taken precedence over all other needs. Thus Communism has largely lost the struggle for the minds of men in Central and Eastern Europe, and democracy has by and large been defeated in Asia. . . . Where democracy lost out in Asia, it did so because its appeal was largely divorced from the life experiences and interests of the peoples of Asia. What the peoples of Asia want above everything else is freedom from western colonialism.[16]

IV. THE NEW POWER QUESTION

The proliferation of atomic weapons has long been the subject and concern of the major powers who have the responsibility of nuclear weapons and compatible delivery systems. To date, the United States and Soviet Russia have by far the great preponderance of nuclear weapon strength. Great Britain has the capability to produce quality weapons and weapons systems, but lacks the economic ability to compete. France has not, to date, produced quality, quantity, nor a suitable weapons delivery system; however, these are avowed aims of French policy. The core of the argument is that

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[16]Morganthau, op. cit., p. 341.

and focus on the role of anti-colonialism. It states:

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scope [illegible] and interests of the peoples of Asia.
It remains true [illegible] colonialism.[12]

IV. The Re-Made Constitution

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signs of inward polity. The core of the movement is that

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[12]Borgenstein, op. cit., p. 141.

these nations represent stable and rational political countries.

Central to the problem is that science and technology may produce low-cost easy-to-manufacture atomic weapons. The hazards then become manifold and complex as nations who lack a mature sense of responsibility or technical competence may get nuclear weapons. The four basic ways total war could start, other than by policy decision, are:[17]

1. War by mechanical failure or human miscalculation.
2. Unauthorized action.
3. False alarm.
4. Brinkmanship.

It is obvious, on the surface, that the chances of nuclear war by one of the above methods are multiplied completely out of proportion for safety by the "N№" power problem.

Particularly discouraging is the attitude of Communist China in regard to the utility of nuclear war. Chou En-lai, with a complete indifference to morality, in 1956, is reported to have said that after the next war there will be "twenty million Americans, five million Englishmen, fifty million Russians, and three hundred million Chinese left."[18]

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[17]Amitai Etzioni, The Hard Way to Peace (New York: Colliers, 1962), pp. 45-52.

[18]Zagoria, op. cit., p. 390.

[illegible]

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The bitterness of current Peking attacks on Moscow regarding promised aid in the nuclear energy field indicate the Russians are as reluctant to see the proliferation of atomic weapons as is the West. In addition, the venom displayed over this issue would tend to lead one to the conclusion that the Chinese Communists are having considerable difficulty in developing a nuclear capability. Fortunately, what is frequently overlooked is that it is one thing to make atomic weapons and another matter completely to develop suitable delivery systems.

One author paints a particularly discouraging picture of low-cost, five-thousand-pound nuclear weapons which could be used in conjunction with Boeing 707 passenger-type aircraft with modifications.[19] Considering the tremendous expenditures and technical skills involved in present United States weapons and systems, it is difficult to reconcile the simple "do-it-yourself" nuclear warfare theory advanced by Mr. Bagdikian with the realities of the contemporary state of the art.

In any event, the question of the "Nth" power is a real political issue, and the most critical nation in this regard must be considered Communist China. It can only be

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[19]Ben H. Bagdikian, "Atomic Bombs for Everyone," Saturday Evening Post (March 2, 1963), p. 26.

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[13] Wes W. Hoglund, "Atomic Bombs for Everyone," _Saturday Evening Post_ Theories 2, 1947), p. 22.

speculation as to how soon Peking will have nuclear weapons in quantity and suitable delivery vehicles. American and Soviet policy makers must plan for that day, as it is a capability Communist China is almost certain to achieve.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The problem facing the American political decision maker in the Far East is: to control a massive social revolution which is highlighted by fanatical nationalism, anti-white colonialism and a demand for better standards of living currently phrased as "rising expectations." Due to the population explosion and the inherent social evils found almost universally in the so-called "backward" areas of the world, most attempts by the high income and high consumption nations to help these poverty stricken countries are failing. The masses of the Far East demand change. In so doing, they look to Communism, and, in particular, Communist China as the ideal to further their cause, create a short-cut to economic success, and provide the leadership for the "south element" (underdeveloped nations) against the "north element" (industrialized nations) in the pending north-south conflict of interests which is rapidly displacing the east-west "cold war" as paramount in importance.

The weapons selected by the leaders of this revolution are ideally suited to the conditions which prevail. These weapons are primarily political and psychological in nature and through the "protracted conflict" concept, the political ends of revolutionary Leninist-Stalinist-Maoist

CONCLUSIONS

Communism can be gained in piecemeal fashion. The military aspect of the threat today varies from terror tactics to guerrilla operations of infiltration and ambush with terrain, climate and the sympathetic response of the peasant to assist. The military threat of the future may more closely approximate that of the traditional mass and maneuver, but for the immediate present is confined to the lower end of the spectrum of violence. The spectrum of violence for which we must be prepared can be considered to have three levels: "(1) massive retaliatory (deterrent) the ultimate reserve, (2) mobile limited warfare (brush fire), and (3) political warfare force (small arms; sticks and stones)."[1]

The Seventh Fleet's contribution to the United States military posture in the Far East vis-à-vis the spectrum of violence can be considered as follows: level one--augmenting the U. S. Air Force Strategic Air Command today. For the future, a great reduction in manned aircraft with a nuclear capability and an increased responsibility as more Polaris weapons system submarines arrive on station; level two--the Seventh Fleet is ideally suited to support indigenous forces or U. S. Army contingents at the "brush fire" level of conflict which are found within its normal operating radius of

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[1]Franklin M. Osanka, Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 417.

action; level three-under unique circumstances the Seventh Fleet might engage in another "Lebanon" type operation; however, in general at this level in the Far East, the Seventh Fleet is usually impotent except for the "fringe benefit" operations described previously in Chapter IV.

Due to the intense social and economic forces which foment violence and unrest in the area, the "political warfare force" will remain a constant reality for the U. S. Department of State to counter for the foreseeable future. Thus, the Seventh Fleet's relevance to the immediate military problem is somewhat circumscribed because of the nature of means used and environment which the enemy has selected to operate within.

In retrospect, the Seventh Fleet has provided the political policy maker with a valid political-military tool. The Seventh Fleet has had varying degrees of military success and political impact, dependent on the specific situation and its use. There have been great psychological victories for the United States due primarily to the Seventh Fleet. The immediate response in Korea, the success of our stated military policy vis-à-vis: Formosa, Quemoy and Matsu Islands, the Tachen Islands evacuation and the Hainan incident of July 1954--all added prestige to the Seventh Fleet. In addition, for the most part the Fleet has created good will and inspired confidence that the United States has the

capability, and will use this capability, to honor its political commitments with regard to overt aggression. In the cases cited, the Seventh Fleet provided the tangible evidence of United States intentions. It would be remiss not to acknowledge the significant contribution that the U. S. Strategic Air Command has made in holding the Soviet Union and Communist China in check. The full extent of SAC's contribution to the success of these naval operations may never be known.

In view of the fact that the non-military elements of conflict are largely political in nature and psychological in execution, the importance of Formosa to the free world and its influence on the sixteen million Overseas Chinese--(a major minority element in practically every country in Southeast Asia)--cannot be dismissed lightly. Many distinguished political leaders and writers have drawn exact parallels between the positions of Free Berlin and Formosa in the ideological and psychological warfare the United States is engaged in. In addition, a free Formosa has direct political implications to the question regarding recognition and the membership of Communist China to the United Nations. Both of these areas are of vital concern to the policy of the United States as long as the agencies of the United Nations and international law are used to further American objectives.

capability, and will use this capability, to pursue its political commitments with regard to overt aggression. In the cases cited, the Seventh Fleet provided the flexible evidence of United States intentions. It would be unwise not to acknowledge the significant contribution that the U. S. strategic Air Command has made in isolating the Soviet Union and Communist China in check. The full extent of this contribution to the success of these naval operations may never be known.

In view of the fact that the non-military elements of conflict are largely political in nature and psychological in execution, the importance of forces to the free world and its influence on the thirteen million Overseas Chinese--a major minority element in practically every country in Southeast Asia)--cannot be dismissed lightly. Many sinophobic political leaders and writers have taken exact parallels between the positions of Free China and Formosa in the ideological and psychological warfare the United States is waging in addition, a Taipei Formosa has direct political implications to the question regarding recognition and the membership of Communist China in the United Nations. Both of these areas are of vital concern to the policy of the United States as long as the objective of the United nations and Independent Iran are used to further Communist objectives.

Considering the technical knowledge required, the financial cost involved (both combined with Soviet reluctance to see Red China as a nuclear power), it does not appear that China will become an effective "NW" power in the immediate future. Nor for the same reasons a seapower which can challenge the United States command of sea within any foreseeable time span.

In summation: the United States Seventh Fleet has had, does have, and will have, psychological and military value which, in turn, creates political impact in the Far East. The nature of power is changing constantly; however, the Seventh Fleet has sufficiently modified and updated its weapons and doctrine to have met the challenge within its mission and the principles of seapower upon which it is based remain essentially valid. Only if the day arrives that Communist China successfully takes the island of Formosa by means of overt military force, contrary to the stated aims of United States policy, can the Seventh Fleet be written off as no longer capable of creating political impact in the Far East.

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